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COOK COUNTY CRIMINAL LAW
PRACTICE IN 1929:
A COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO CRIME
AND A NOTORIOUS TRIAL
THOMAS F. GERAGHTY*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes the practice of criminal law in the courts of
Cook County in 1929, using a 1929 study of Cook County's criminal
justice system and one high-profile case as the basis for that descrip-
tion. The background description of Cook County's criminal justice
system and criminal law practice comes primarily from a report writ-
ten by Chicago's civic leaders in 1929 entitled, The Illinois Crime
Survey [hereinafter Survey].' It is a model of a comprehensive study
of a criminal justice system. The Survey describes the state of the
criminal justice system in Cook County, a system that was then per-
ceived to be in crisis as the result of the influences of organized
crime, political corruption, and isolation from best practices.
Against this background, I examine the transcripts and docu-
ments associated with one trial, People v. Fisher This case, a bank
robbery/murder in which a bank security guard was killed, received
front page attention from Chicago's newspapers during 1929 and
1930. All of the defendants were black, as was the victim. Three of
Professor of Law, Associate Dean, Director Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law. I would like to thank Claire Boyle (N.U. 2002), Eloise P. Lawrence
(N.U. 2002) and Ashley L. Baynham (N.U. 2004) for their valuable research assistance.
I THE ILL. Ass'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (John H. Wigmore
ed., 1929). This study, called the "most ambitious" of its time, was modeled upon the 1925
Missouri Crime Survey, which led to the creation of public crime commissions in cities
around the United States. RAYMOND MOLEY, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS 220 (1930). Moley
was one of the authors of The Illinois Crime Survey.
2 People v. Fisher, 172 N.E. 743 (Il1. 1930). This case involved several defendants; Lafon
Fisher, Leon Brown, Leonard Shadlow, Melvin Jenkins, Stephen Dixon, and Herbert Hare.
Fisher, Brown, Shadlow, and Jenkins were tried together. Herbert Hare was tried separately.
Stephen Dixon was apprehended after the others were tried and pled guilty to murder.
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the defendants, Shadlow, Brown, and Fisher, were sentenced to death
and were executed? Defendants Herbert Hare, Steven Dixon, and
Melvin Jenkins, were sentenced to life in prison. Hare and Dixon
died in prison, Dixon in 1933' and Hare in 1946.' Jenkins was pa-
roled in 1955.6 The killing in the Fisher case, while it occurred during
the commission of a felony, was not premeditated.7
As I investigated the criminal law practice of the 1920's, I was
drawn to make comparisons between modem day practice and that of
the 1920's. Those familiar with modem day criminal law practice
will note the development of the law post-1929 regarding the admis-
sibility and reliability of confessions,8 pre-trial publicity,9 pre-trial
discovery," the law of confrontation,"' prosecutorial ethics, 2 right to
counsel and adequacy of defense services, 13 and issues surrounding
the implementation of the death penalty. 4 These "advances" in
criminal procedure run counter to many of the suggestions made for
reform in the late 1920's. The suggestions made by 1920's criminal
3 See ED BAUMAN, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY ON YOUR SOUL (1993).
4 Record of the Illinois Parole Board regarding Steven Dixon, July 3, 1930 (on file with
the author).
5 Record of the Illinois Parole Board regarding Herbert Hare, Dec. 8, 1922 (on file with
the author).
6 Record of the Illinois Parole Board regarding Melvin Jenkins, June 28, 1929 (on file
with the author).
7 A review of the abstract of the trial testimony reveals that the bank guard was killed by
the robbers after he pulled a gun and advanced toward the gang. By comparison, in an ear-
lier notorious case, Leopold and Loeb, both white and affluent, were given life sentences for
a crime that involved kidnapping and killing a young boy. See, e.g., HAL HIGDON, THE
CRIME OF THE CENTURY 261-70 (1975).
8 See Dickerson v. U.S, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 246 (1966);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
9 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
1o See Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1994); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11 See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987); Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
12 See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8. The Illinois version of
rule 3.8, unlike the model rule, states that: "(a) the duty of a public prosecutor or other gov-
ernment lawyer is to seek justice, not merely to convict." ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rule 3.8(a).
13 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Argensinger v. Humlen, 407 U.S.
25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
14 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding Georgia's death penalty
scheme unconstitutional because it created a substantial risk that it would be enforced in an
arbitrary and capricious manner); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of Georgia's new death penalty sentencing scheme that provides carefully
drafted standards to govern the application of the death sentence); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding mandatory death for first degree murder unconstitu-
tional).
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reform commissions included limitation of the right to jury trial,
more joint trials of co-defendants, and permitting comments on a de-
fendant's failure to testify."5 Comparisons between old and new will
reveal that despite the advances made in the development of the law,
the modem system of justice relies as much as the old one did on the
integrity, skill and vision of those who manage justice, including the
police as well as the lawyers and judges who try cases. New constitu-
tional safeguards, while they increase the potential for justice to be
done, do not guarantee integrity, fairness, and impartiality. Perhaps
the best example of our modem system's shortcomings is the uncov-
ering of many, wrongful convictions, particularly in death penalty
cases. These wrongful convictions (thirteen in Illinois alone) oc-
curred in the modem day, despite decades of improvements in proce-
dural protections.
An empirical study of the racial composition and economic status
of the lawyers, defendants, and judges who have populated the
Criminal Court of Cook County is beyond the scope of this essay.
However, no one can deny that criminal practice in today's Cook
County Criminal Court involves primarily the prosecution and de-
fense of young black men. A substantial proportion of defendants in
Cook County have always been designated as indigent. 6 These racial
and economic facts affect all aspects of Cook County's past and ex-
isting criminal justice system, including the care with which prosecu-
tions were and are conducted, the resources devoted to the defense of
criminal cases, and the attitudes and qualities of judges who preside
over trials and administer Cook County's courts. 7
15 MOLEY, supra note 1, at 94-100.
16 In 1923, The Chicago Bar Association's Committee on Defense of Prisoners estimated
that "half of those arrested for crimes could not afford counsel." Consequently, volunteers
had to be found annually for more than 600 cases. HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY,
THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION 1874-1974, at 166 (1974). By 1947, the Cook County Pub-
lic Defender was representing almost 1300 defendants per year, over half of criminal cases
in Cook County. EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 201-02 (1951).
In 1989, 78% of defendants in local jails around the country had assigned counsel. STEVEN
K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
INDIGENT DEFENSE 4 (1996). In 1996, publicly financed counsel represented 82% of felony
defendants in the 75 most populous counties in the U.S. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
5 (2000).
17 To prove this point, as it relates to the present day, a field trip is suggested. Visit the
criminal court of Cook County, located at 26th & California. Then visit the Richard J. Daley
Center in Chicago's Loop, the Cook County courthouse in which civil cases are heard. Visit
the Dirksen Federal Courthouse in the Loop, where both criminal and civil federal cases are
heard. Compare and contrast.
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In 1929, the "new" criminal court and Cook County Jail and
court complex was opened. The Fisher case was one of the first tried
in that building. One Chicago newspaper noted that the new jail had
"1302 cells each with running water and other conveniences."" To-
day, the Cook County Jail complex houses 10,000 inmates.
II. THE CULTURE OF THE CRIMINAL PRACTICE IN THE 1920's: AN
OVERVIEW
I begin with a very brief overview of the criminal practice in the
Cook County Circuit Courts during the 1920's. This overview is
based primarily upon accounts contained in The Illinois Crime Sur-
vey.
The Survey, initiated by the Illinois State Bar Association and
funded by the Industrial Club of Chicago, was a massive undertaking
comprising 1100 pages and including detailed statistical analyses of
the operation of criminal courts throughout Illinois, as well as the re-
sults of observations of the system and interviews of the key partici-
pants. 9 Key collaborators included judges, lawyers, academicians,
and law enforcement officials.2 The Survey included examination of
the functions of both the trial and appellate courts, as well as the per-
formance of police, judges, and prosecutors.2 In addition, the Survey
focused on the role of organized crime in Chicago, finding that the
courts, prosecutors, and police were too often subject to corrupt in-
fluences.22 Although the Survey was billed as an objective scientific
study of the criminal justice system (which it was), there can be little
doubt that the reality of corruption in the system in the 1920's
prompted high-minded citizens of Chicago to organize and to back
this Survey in order to promote the creation of a corruption-free and
more efficient system. There are indications that the court system it-
18 Complete Plansfor Abandoning Old County Jail, CHI. TRB., Mar. 1, 1930
'9 See THE ILL. ASS'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1.
20 Id.
21 Most recently in Cook County, the Chief Judge of the Criminal Court has appointed a
Special Prosecutor to look into allegations that, in the 1980's, a particular group of police
detectives tortured suspects at Chicago's Area 2 headquarters. In Re Appointment of Special
Prosecutor, No. 2001 Misc. 4 (Cir. Ct. Cook County April 24, 2002) (Mem. Op. and Order
appointing Special Prosecutor). As of the publication of this article, a group of lawyers have
sought to disqualify the Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County and all Cook County
judges from participation in cases in which defendants allege that they were tortured by Area
2 detectives. Jerry Crimmins, Sweeping Requested is "Novel, " CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 23,
2002, at 3; Steve Mills, Plea Made for Outside Judges; Request is Filed in Burge Cases,
CHLI. TRIB., July 23, 2002, at IN.
22 THE ILL. ASS'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 815-1087.
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self recognized that it was in crisis and sought to publicize the dan-
gers inherent in making the criminal justice system the scapegoat for
larger societal problems. 3 Chief Justice DeYoung of the Supreme
Court of Illinois noted:
The public has been aroused to support the war to reserve government
against the attacks of the anti-social elements .... We may expect bene-
ficial results ... but there is a need for caution that we do not overstep
ourselves. There are modem philosophers who are impatient to wi e out
the restraints in law that have proved their value through the ages.
DeYoung also noted that some reformers were calling for aboli-
tion of the presumption of innocence and the abolition of the re-
quirement of unanimous verdicts in criminal cases. 5
In 1929, leaders of the Circuit Court of Cook County called for
the establishment of a specialized criminal court for Chicago cases.
Judge Frank Commerford stated:
The criminal court should be a complete unit in itself, and the judges
permanently assigned to that work. By that system, the judges would be-
come specialists in criminal work and would be able to speedily dispose
of cases. The present system of shifting judges from one branch to an-
other each year does not allow the judge to specialize in criminal law.
26
The shooting death of a young prosecutor, who at the time of his
death was in the company of known gangsters, was used by the Sur-
vey as an epiphany-one which characterized the crisis:
(1) that crime was organized on a scale and with resources unprece-
dented in the history of Chicago; (2) that the leading gangsters were
practically immune from punishment; and (3) that the position of power
and affluence achieved by gangsters and their immunity from punish-
ment was due to an unholy alliance between organized crime and poli-
tics.
27
The causes of this "unholy alliance" ran deep. Dean Wigmore
described the "larger causes" of the problem:
23 Bill Proposes New Criminal Court for Chicago Cases Only, CFn. TRIB., Jan. 23, 1929,
at 4.
24 Public Awakening to Court Needs, De Young Says, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 26, 1929, at 14.
25 id.
26 Bill Proposes New Criminal Court for Chicago Cases Only, supra note 23, at 4.
27 THE ILL. Ass'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 1091.
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My guess is that they are all reducible ultimately to one prime cause; and
that cause is: the Selfishness of the Ordinary Citizen'".
Here is an instance: Some years ago a certain Chief of Police (not
the present one), when a friend of mine asked him why a certain desir-
able measure was not taken by him, replied thus: "I haven't had the time
to get at it. One-half of my day's time is taken up with fending off re-
quests made by all sorts of citizens, from aldermen down, who want me
to do something that I shouldn't do or to let them do something that they
shouldn't do." No doubt every Mayor, every Judge, and every Prosecut-
ing Officer could also tell a similar story.
28
The Illinois Crime Survey concluded:
To cope with the problem of organized crime through honest and effi-
cient law enforcement, the police department, the judges, and the courts,
and the state's attorney's office must be sustained by the constant force of
intelligent public opinion.
To be intelligent, the public must have a continuous supply of reli-
able information both upon the work of these law enforcing agencies and
upon the course of developments in the crime situation. Current newspa-
per accounts of crime news are insufficient for this purpose. Nor can re-
liance be placed exclusively upon the Surveys of their own work given
out by law enforcing agencies. These are desirable and necessary, but
they must take their places in a larger scheme of crime accounting.
It is necessary to devise and institute a comprehensive plan of fact
finding and Surveying "to provide the public with authentic information
upon the efficiency and integrity of its law enforcing agencies, upon the
activities and practices of criminal gangs and gangsters, and upon crime
in all its manifestations."
29
The Survey's credibility was bolstered by its attention to statisti-
cal detail. The authors of the Survey made their case based upon
numbers-numbers of cases brought into the system and numbers of
cases diverted out of it. The Survey demonstrated that relatively few
cases brought into the system were prosecuted to the fullest extent of
the law-that is by a trial in criminal court." Voluntary dismissals by
the prosecution, the Survey alleged, were all too common in the sys-
28 Id. at 1096 (emphasis added).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 219.
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tem and damaged its effectiveness and credibility. Defendants were
too often allowed to plead to lesser charges to avoid felony convic-
tions.3
In addition to relying on the numbers, the authors of the Survey
spent a great deal of time observing practice in the criminal courts-
both in the municipal (misdemeanor) courts and in the felony trial
courts.32 The observations of practice were made by people with ex-
perience in the practice, former prosecutors, judges, and members of
the more elite elements of the legal profession.33 According to the
Survey, the "branch courts" were in chaos and were run as a business
for all concerned.34 Prosecutors stood idly by (working only a few
hours a day).35 Defense lawyers openly solicited business, employing
various tactics to make cases "go away."36 The police were often
placed in the role of prosecuting cases without the assistance of the
prosecutors.37 Judges failed to control their courtrooms.3"
It was in the branch courts that many serious cases were dis-
missed at the preliminary hearing stage before they could be sent on
to felony trial courtrooms.39 The Survey observed that preliminary
hearings-the hearings utilized in the majority of cases to determine
whether a case would be tried as a felony-were a sham: "to con-
clude, the whole proceeding in a preliminary hearing is a mockery of
law administration. 4' The Survey noted that in part because of the
chaos and corruption in branch courts, only one in five felony cases
filed resulted in a finding of guilty and that "many of the ten thou-
sand who went free are bombers, murderers, robbers, burglars, rap-
ists, desperate men, whose presence is a constant threat to organized
society and the security of property."4'
The State's Attorney of Cook County had a different take on this
problem. He viewed waiving felony prosecutions as a way of reduc-
ing the backlog in criminal cases.42 The Chicago Tribune [hereinafter
3' id.
" Id. at 11-21.
33 id.
34 Id. at 393-419.
31 Id. at 406-18.
36 Id. at 408-10.
371 d. at 406-08.
38 Id. at 404-06.
39 Id. at 305-08.
40 Id. at 308.
41 Id. at 295.
42 Swanson Asks His Aids to Use Common Sense, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 23, 1929, at 2.
2002]
THOMAS F. GERAGHTY
Tribune] reported in 1929 that State's Attorney Swanson asked his
assistants to use "common sense" in dismissing felonies.43 This was
in response to a report from the Judicial Advisory Council "calling
attention to the clogging of court calendars because of the failure to
waive felonies in any case.""' An earlier Tribune article called atten-
tion to overcrowding of the jail as a result of holding prisoners on
felony charges that should have been disposed of as misdemeanors.45
In the felony trial courtrooms, a lesser degree of chaos prevailed,
but the criticisms leveled by the Survey regarding the disposition of
felony cases were just as devastating. According to the Survey, prose-
cutors were routinely unprepared for trial. 6 The Survey recom-
mended that prosecutors be assigned to cases instead of to
courtrooms to ensure that the prosecutors assigned to the case were
prepared. Voluntary dismissals in the felony trial courts were com-
mon, especially dismissals for want of prosecution.48 The Survey ob-
served:
if the state's attorney is delinquent in such cases and by his inaction per-
mits witnesses to remain away from prosecution in cases in which they
are vital assets of the state, and if he permits them to be coerced into re-
maining away by threats or other means well-known to Chicago's un-
derworld, there is no public agency that can discover his shortcomings.
49
The Survey also noted that the professionals within the system
(especially prosecutors) too often blamed acquittal-prone juries for
allowing criminals to escape punishment.5 The Survey demonstrated
convincingly that, in fact, juries were not to blame." First, relatively
few of the cases charged were eventually tried by juries. 2 The vast
majority of cases were plea bargained for lesser charges or voluntar-
ily dismissed by the prosecution, many because witnesses failed to
appear in court. 3
43 id.
44 Id.
45 Drive on Felony Waivers Found Slowing Courts, CHI. TRIB, Jan. 22, 1929, at 6.
46 THE ILL. Ass'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 226.
41 Id. at 226.
48 Id. at 303-04.
4 9 1d. at 303.
50 d. at 226.
'Id. at 228-29.
52Id. at 239-40.
53 Id. The cause of the failure to convict in felony cases was hotly debated. The Chicago
Crime Commission blamed the phenomenon on judges. Judges blamed it on prosecutors.
[Vol. 92
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Prosecutors were not the only object of criticism. The Survey
also denounced defense lawyers and the appellate courts: "The
methods of unscrupulous criminal lawyers were thought to be a large
factor in the system's state of disrepair, and responsibility was placed
on the appellate courts for reversals on technical grounds that had lit-
tle to do with the merits."54
Defense lawyers who practiced in the misdemeanor courts were
described as corrupt.5 A passage from the. Survey paints a colorful
and disturbing portrait of the criminal defense lawyer of the 1920's:
Many of the branches of the Chicago Municipal Court seem to tolerate a
condition in connection with attorneys for the defense, which is more se-
rious even than the lack of prosecution which has already been de-
scribed. It seems to be customary for certain lawyers to assume a
proprietary attitude toward defense cases. These privileged characters
come to the court daily, deposit their coats and hats immediately upon ar-
rival and participate in the activities exactly as if they were paid atten-
dants. They solicit business very largely through the clerks, bailiffs,
assistant prosecutors and occasionally through the judges themselves.
They also mingle freely among the unfortunates who are haled be-
fore the court and get business first-hand. The continuous presence of
such a permanent defense lawyer in the court room means that pleasant
and sometimes profitable relationships are established between him and
court attaches. Such lawyers have been known to divide the profits from
their activities with the kindly officers who throw business to them. In
fact, it is stated on good authority that occasionally such a privileged po-
sition in a given branch court is paid for by the lawyer, either on a per-
centage basis or as an initial fee, for the privilege of preying upon the
victims of that particular neighborhood. The names of such men who op-
erate in a given court are not difficult to secure-in fact the Survey has
practically a complete list of the "regulars."
The criminal branches of the Municipal Court have at least one and
some have two or three of these "regular" attorneys. Harrison Street has
about seven. The ease with which they secure favors in a given court and
the greater degree of success which they seem to have in their cases indi-
cates the presence of what maybe a well defined "ring" within certain
courts, or what may be a less definite, but nevertheless potent, under-
standing between them and the officials of the court. Where such a
See Mark H. Haller, Urban Crime and Criminal Justice: The Chicago Case, 57 J. OF AM.
HIsr. 619 (1964).
4 Id. at 202.
" Id. at 408-410.
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"ring" is in existence the defense lawyer holds his status by giving fa-
vors, if not money, to those who assist him.
The presence of these men and the dubious relationships which they
have with court officials suggests a condition which is dangerous and
reprehensible in the extreme. It is probable, however, that the situation
cannot be met by direct negative action. In other words, it might be pos-
sible to drive out of the court room certain of these parasites but their
function would be fulfilled in some other way. We may as well face the
fact that these men are fulfilling a necessary function in the court but in a
very objectionable manner, and under a status that is highly undesirable.
It is quite possible that some modified form of the public defender
system would be helpful in ridding the Municipal Court of the undesir-
able aspects which we have described. An office might be created under
the jurisdiction of the chief justice to defend the indigent and to institute
a system of inspection throughout the branches of the court for the pur-
pose of eliminating the solicitation of business by certain lawyers also to
advise all defendants as to their rights and duties in the employment of
counsel and the compensation thereof.
56
The chairman of the Chicago Bar Association's Sub-Committee
on the Establishment of a Public Defender System described lawyer-
ing in the felony courts in an equally uncomplimentary way:
Many of the attorneys who seek assignment [of felony cases] are of the
undesirable type who accept such cases only for the possible fee they can
extract from the defendant or his relatives. With this in mind, instead of
seeking a prompt trial, they continue the case and drag it out as much as
possible, thus congesting the criminal court calendar with numerous old
cases that should have been disposed of. If they find that no fee can be
gotten they will frequently lose interest in the case and either persuade
the defendant to plead guilty when in fact the defendant should not plead
guilty, or they will make only a perfunctory defense. On the other hand,
if they succeed in getting the fee, only too often will they connive with
the defendant and fabricate an unethical defense.
57
56 THE ILL. Ass'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 408-10. But see Hailer, supra
note 53, at 625. ("The attorneys and law professors who were the reformers had little in
common with the lawyers who practiced criminal law; indeed, they often did not bother to
conceal their contempt for the training and ethics of the lawyers who practiced regularly in
the criminal courts.") (citation omitted).
57 Charles Mishkin, The Public Defender, 22 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 496
(1931).
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As a result of the continuing criticism of the fairness and effi-
ciency of the Cook County Criminal Courts, a Public Defender was
appointed in 1930:58
During the 1920's, decades prior to the Gideon case, the legitimacy of
the Cook County courts was attacked on two fronts. Judges, prosecutors,
and police were charged with closing their eyes to the activities of gang-
sters-and thus with failing to effectively enforce the laws and prevent
crime. At the same time, many charged that judges, prosecutors, and pri-
vate defense lawyers were indifferent to the rights of the poor: relatively
innocent folk who found themselves in trouble with the law were apt
summarily to receive more punishment than they in fact deserved.
Although the Cook County public defender was hired to represent
indigents, it is clear from historical accounts that the office was created
more to serve the needs of the courts than to serve those of defendants.
The courts accepted the public defender as a way to make the system
seem more efficient, more fair. 59
The Survey did not limit its critique of the criminal justice system
to judges and lawyers. It also criticized police practices-both cor-
ruption and over-zealousness and the extent to which they were tol-
erated by prosecutors and judges.6° In particular, the Survey criticized
the practice of relying upon coerced confessions to solve crimes."
The Survey noted that police, "criticized for their inability to discover
the perpetrator of a particular crime, scolded by the press and the
public, and smarting under criticism of failure, have resorted to the
'third degree' and other improper and dishonest police methods."6
The Survey went on to note that:
a confession so obtained is worse than useless. Relying upon its suffi-
ciency to secure a conviction, the police abandon all effort to obtain fur-
ther proof. Its rejection by the court leaves the prosecuting officer
58 LISA J. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE SHADOWS OF
REPUTE 38-39 (1989). The Public Defender filed his first report in November, 1930. In that
report, the public defender stated that the office represented "60 percent of all cases ar-
raigned before the criminal court because the defendants lacked funds to employ counsel."
CHI. DEFENDER, Nov. 8, 1930 at 2.
59 MCINTYRE, supra note 58, at 44.
60 THE ILL. Ass'N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 289-92, 357-76.
61 Id. at 290-91. This problem has persisted. Four death row inmates who claimed that
their confessions were the product of police torture were recently pardoned. See Steve Mills
& Maurice Possley, Ryan to Pardon 4 on Death Row; Men Say They Were Tortured by Chi-
cago Police, Cn. TIUB. Jan. 10, at 1.
62
1 Id. at 289.
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without any evidence to support the charge. The public, in the meantime,
is unable to understand how a self-confessed criminal goes free. Such an
educational process (educating police that unlawful means cannot be tol-
erated) will doubtless be of slow growth, but with the right kind of effort
it will not be difficult to establish the same public confidence in the truth
of a policeman's testimony as that which now prevails in England and
other European countries.
6 3
III. PEOPLE V. FISHER
The trial of the Fisher case was conducted within the system de-
scribed by the Survey. The lawyers involved in the case, both prose-
cution and defense, displayed skill and dedication. The defense
lawyers, in particular, fought with remarkable zeal to save their cli-
ents' lives in the face of overwhelming odds. The defense team con-
sisted of John Fogle on behalf of Leonard Shadlow, Richard E.
Westbrooks on behalf of Leon Brown, and Joseph Lofton on behalf
of Lafon Fisher.64 Herbert Aschin represented Melvin Jenkins. The
prosecutors were Charles A. Bellows (who later became one of Chi-
cago's leading defense lawyers) and C. Wayland Brooks (who later
became a United States Senator from Illinois). Judge Robert Gentzel
presided over the trial.65 No doubt, the Fisher case was not the "run
of the mill" felony described in the Survey. A review of the trial re-
cord reveals that there was a pool of able and dedicated defense law-
yers who, in the highest tradition of the legal profession, were not
afraid to take on an unpopular case.66
A. THE ROBBERY
On January 18, 1929, at 1:00 p.m. in the afternoon, five men en-
tered the Franklin Trust and Savings Bank on the south side of Chi-
cago. They were armed with pistols and a shotgun. A holdup was
announced. One of the robbers vaulted over the cashier's cage and
began to scoop up money. On duty that day at the bank as a security
guard was Marvin French, a retired Chicago police officer. French
pulled his gun. There was an exchange of gunshots. Twenty shots
631 d. at 291.
64 Supreme Court of Illinois, People v. Fisher Abstract of Record, Nov. 16, 1929 at 1-5
(on file with author) [hereinafter Abstract].
65 Id.
66 Lofton and Westbrooks were court-appointed. Their petition for fees notes that they
spent II full days in trial, in excess of 5 days preparing for trial, at least 5 days on post trial
motions. Each lawyer asked for fee of $250.00. Petition for Fees (on file with the author).
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were fired. French was mortally wounded, two bank employees suf-
fered gunshot wounds, and the robbers fled the bank carrying with
them approximately $2000.67
B. THE INVESTIGATION
The police responded to the scene quickly and a manhunt for the
robbers began. The investigation led to the discovery of a "Negro
Crime Headquarters," from which twenty-three prisoners, "every one
an ex-convict - will be identified for other crimes," were taken into
custody.6" The investigating detective "had been told of a place where
Negro ex-convicts congregated and where they planned their
crimes."" The Tribune reported on January 20, 1929, that in a room
at that address, the police found four men and $200, the "bills being
identified by the serial numbers as part of the loot of the Franklin
Bank."7 The Tribune reported on January 21, 1929, that Leonard
Shadlow, the purported leader of the robbery gang, and "nineteen
other colored desperados were captured in a police raid at 3341 South
Wabash Avenue."7'
Among the men taken into custody at 3341 South Wabash were
Leonard Shadlow, Leon Brown, Lafon Fisher, and Melvin Jenkins.
Police remained at the Wabash address on the lookout for Herbert
Hare, reputed to be the "director general" of the alleged robbers'
den." Police were also on the lookout for Steve Dixon, the alleged
mastermind of the robbery.73
The Tribune went on to report that after his arrest, Shadlow
agreed to make a statement "if he could get immunity":
Deputy Stege communicated with Commissioner of Police Russell and
State's Attorney Swanson and they went to Stege's office for a consulta-
tion. Stege announced afterwards that he had promised Shadlow he
would try to save his life, saying he could do that conscientiously, inas-
much as Shadlow had no part in the actual shooting.
67 Seize 23 in Robbers' Lair: Caught in Raid, Admit Murder and Holdup, Ci-n. TRIB., Jan.










Shadlow said that the robbery was planned by Hare, a rooming
house keeper, who sent all roomers out on crime jobs and then shared the
proceeds with them. If he didn't get money from them that way, Shad-
low said, Hare charged them high rent for the rooms.
74
According to the Tribune's account of what Shadlow allegedly
told police, Dixon called Shadlow to the Wabash address. Fisher was
in charge of the planning of the robbery. Fisher told Shadlow to
drive and to remain outside with the car running.75 Dixon was given
the shotgun and was told to announce the holdup.76 Jenkins was to
stay at the door and not let anybody out. According to the Tribune, in
Shadlow's first statement to police he said that he was outside the
bank when the shots were fired. 77 Brown, Fisher, and Dixon were in-
side the bank.78
The Tribune reported that Fisher gave police and prosecutors a
different account of the robbery. According to Fisher, Shadlow fired
the fatal shots that killed French, and Shadlow was the leader of the
conspiracy. 79 Fisher also told police that Shadlow was the leader of
the group. The shotgun used in the robbery was found in the car used
in the robbery. The car was found abandoned not far from where the
robbery occurred."0 Jenkins took police to where a .45 caliber pistol
was found.
The same Tribune article that detailed the investigation of the
crime and the arrest of the suspects also carried the official records of
the defendants' criminal convictions. (Shadlow: three years in the
Missouri Penitentiary for robbery; Fisher: not guilty of robbery, two
years in the Penitentiary for armed robbery, returned to prison for
violation of parole for twenty-six robbery charges and one assault to
kill, sent to Joliet Penitentiary for robbery; Brown: five years in the
74 Id. (The prosecutors would later contend at the trial of Fisher, Brown, Shadlow, and
Jenkins that Shadlow fired the fatal shot. In papers submitted to the Parole and Pardon
Board in connection with Dixon's commitment to the penitentiary, the prosecutors stated
that Dixon was the shooter. See Letter from John A. Swanson, State's Attorney of Cook
County, to Henry C. Hill, Warden, State Penitentiary of Illinois (July 1, 1930)(on file with
author)).
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Missouri State Penitentiary for robbery; Jenkins: served four months
in Detroit for selling narcotics.)"'
All four defendants gave statements to the police. After giving
those statements, witnessed by persons who had allegedly observed
the robbery,8 2 Fisher, Brown, Shadlow and Jenkins were taken to the
Franklin Bank and Trust to re-enact the crime. This re-enactment
was front-page news. 3
A review of the trial record and other documents in the case re-
veals considerable confusion over one key fact. The State's theory at
the trial of Fisher, Shadlow, Brown, and Jenkins was that Shadlow
was in possession of the sawed off shotgun 4 and that Shadlow fired
the shotgun at French, mortally wounding him. 5 The Supreme Court
of Illinois, in reviewing the convictions of Fisher, Shadlow, and
Brown, noted that John E. Geraghty, a patron of the bank who wit-
nessed the robbery, identified Shadlow as the robber who had the
shotgun. 6 Leo Pocquette, an employee of the bank who exchanged
gunshots with the robbers, and who was shot in the foot during the
holdup, testified that Shadlow had the shotgun. 7 So did an employee
of the bank, Alexander McKay.8 Another employee of the bank,
Walter Lorenze, testified that Shadlow had a pistol.8 9
The defendants and several witnesses, in their statements to the
police, put the shotgun in the hands of Steven Dixon, who managed
81 Id.
82 Id. (Reporting that "Dr. John Roy French, Dr. Robert McEwen, and John Geraghty, a
coal dealer, witnessed the signed confessions of Shadlow and the others. Deputy Stege ex-
plained he took the precaution to prevent repudiation of the confessions later. Numerous
photographs also were taken of the prisoners by official police photographers thus establish-
ing a precedent in the handling of criminal cases, Deputy Stege declared").
83 id.
84 See Abstract, supra note 64, Letter from State's Attorney to Board of Pardon and Pa-
roles Regarding Fisher, Shadlow, Brown, and Jenkins (Apr. 9, 1930) (on file with author);
Letter from Stephen Dixon (on file with author).
85 In reviewing the convictions of the defendants, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in its
narrative of the facts, stated: "Evidence showed that [French's] death was caused by two
loads from a shotgun in the hands of one of the robbers." Fisher, 172 N.E. at 746.
86 id.
87 See Abstract, supra note 64, at 215. Mr. Poquette testified that after he was shot, he
was taken to the hospital. The defendants were brought to him and he allegedly identified
Shadlow as the man with the shotgun only after Shadlow was told to say "stick 'em up" and
was told to hold the shotgun. Before Shadlow was ordered to speak and to hold the shotgun,
Poquette told the police only that Shadlow's "face looked familiar, but I wasn't sure of his
identity ... but as soon as he opened his mouth, I recognized him." Id. at 215.
88 Id. at 160.
89 1d. at 210.
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to escape arrest until after the others were tried.90 Robert McEwen, a
dentist who worked above the bank, looked out his window after he
heard gunshots and saw a man with a shotgun walk out of the bank.
His description of the man with the shotgun fit Dixon, not Shadlow.9"
Moreover, McEwen testified that the man with the shotgun was
wounded, with blood on his face.92 It was undisputed that the only
robber who was injured was Dixon. McEwen identified Brown and
Fisher as the men he saw coming out of the bank with the man with
the shotgun.93 Brown had a pistol.94 At the trial of Shadlow, Brown,
Jenkins, and Fisher, McEwen testified that he did not see the man
with the shotgun in the courtroom.9" Shadlow was in the courtroom;
Dixon had not yet been apprehended.
When Dixon was arrested, after the trial of Fisher, Shadlow,
Brown, and Jenkins, Dixon confessed to being in possession of the
shotgun. Moreover, the State's Attorney in his letter to the Warden
of Joliet that accompanied Dixon to prison, stated that Dixon had the
shotgun.96 However, in the Fisher trial, the State. argued that Shadlow
had the shotgun (the State claimed in its closing that five witnesses
claimed that Shadlow had the shotgun).97 One of the prosecutors in
the case, C. Wayland Brooks,98 argued in closing that the credibility
of the prosecution was enhanced by the fact that the State had called
five witnesses who testified that Shadlow had the shotgun and one
who said that Dixon had the shotgun.99 Brooks seemed to concede
that Dixon fired the shotgun, but at the same time suggested that the
90 Id. at 296, 303, 312, 322.
"' Id. at 220.
92 Id. at 246.
93  d. at 221.
94 Id.
95 Another fact that confirms that Dixon, not Shadlow, had the shotgun was that John
French, the nephew of the victim Martin French, testified that he spoke to Shadlow at the po-
lice station. Shadlow told French that he remained on the scene and saw his uncle being
placed on the stretcher. Id. at 248. Officer Barry, who found the car that had been used in
the robbery, testified that when he found the car shortly after the robbery, the shotgun was in
the car. Id. at 257, 246.
96 Letter from John A. Swanson, State's Attorney of Cook County, to Henry C. Hill,
Warden, State Penitentiary of Illinois, supra note 74.
97 Abstract, supra note 64, at 472.
98 C. Wayland Brooks, a 1926 graduate of the Northwestern University School of Law,
later became a United States Senator from Illinois, serving from 1940 to 1949.
99 Abstract, supra note 64, at 472.
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shotgun might have been given to Shadlow by Dixon after the first
shot was fired."to
In all statements concerning the case filed with the Board of Par-
don and Parole regarding Shadlow, Brown, Jenkins, and Fisher, the
State asserted that Shadlow killed French.' One observer noted that
after Dixon was arrested, the State's Attorney and Dixon's lawyers
moved quickly to arrange a plea for Dixon in return for a life sen-
tence.0 2 Dixon was then whisked out of town in order to avoid the
publicity that his admission, inconsistent with the State's theory at
trial, might cause.0 3
C. THE DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS
The defendants were not given access to their confessions until
they were introduced at trial, nor were they permitted to challenge the
introduction of their statements before trial. In response to the defen-
dants' request that they be allowed access to their statements before
trial, the judge ruled that he had no power to "direct the state's attor-
ney to give up any of his exhibits before they are offered."'0 4
1. Hearing on Motion to Suppress Confessions
Initially, the judge was content to allow the State to refer to the
confessions in opening statements before their admissibility was
ruled upon. The defense talked him out of this, and so after the trial
began, when the State sought to offer the statements into evidence,
the judge held a hearing outside of the presence of the jury to deter-
mine whether the statements were admissible."0 5 As noted above, the
State had already let the community know about the facts and con-
tents of the confessions through the newspapers.'06
'
00 Id. at 475.
101 See, e.g., Letter from John A. Swanson, State's Attorney of Cook County, to the Divi-
sion of Pardons and Paroles (Apr. 9, 1930) (on file with author) (stating "Shadlow, Brown,
and Dixon entered the bank, and Jenkins remained at the door. At a signal their guns were
drawn, and Shadlow brandished his sawed-off shotgun . . . Shadlow, who had a sawed off
shotgun shot him [French] once in the arm, shot him again in the leg, making a hole as big as
a water glass .... ).
102 Petition to Commute the Sentence of Death Imposed by the Criminal Court of Cook
County, Ill. Upon Leon Brown to Life Imprisonment, Dec. 13, 1930 (on file with author).
103 Abstract, supra note 64, at 337-42.
104 Id. at 98.
'05 Id. at 60-148.
106 Seize 23 in Robber's Lair, supra note 67; Second Murder Charge Made Against Bank
Robbery Chief supra note 71; Two Murders Laid at Door of Bandit Leader, CH. TRIB., Jan.
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a) How the Statements Were Obtained: The Defendants'
Versions
Shadlow, the first defendant to make a statement to the police,
testified that he was slapped and kicked before he confessed." 7 In his
first statement to the police, Shadlow claimed that he was the driver
of the car and that he did not enter the bank."'8 In his first statement,
he also told the police that Dixon got out of the car with the shot-
gun.19 Six hours later, the police elicited another statement from
Shadlow. In this statement, Shadlow stated that he went into the
bank with a pistol. However, he continued to assert that Dixon had
the shotgun."0 He saw "Shorty" (Dixon) fire the shotgun at French."'
Shadlow was treated at the Cook County Jail for a bruised neck."2
Shadlow testified that before he gave his statement, he asked
John Stege, the Chicago Police Commissioner, for a lawyer. This re-
quest was corroborated by one of the police officers who arrested
Shadlow."3 Commissioner Stege denied, however, that Shadlow
asked for an attorney. 114
Shadlow testified that he told Commissioner Stege, "if you get
me an attorney, I'm ready to tell the truth.""' 5 According to Shad-
low's testimony, Commissioner Stege asked Shadlow if speaking to
the State's Attorney would be "all right.""' 6 Shadlow, undoubtedly
confused about the role of the State's Attorney, said "yes." The
Commissioner called the State's Attorney, John Swanson. Swanson
sent an assistant State's Attorney, Charles Bellows, to interview
Shadlow." 7  Shadlow, perhaps thinking that the State's Attorney
21, 1929, at 3; Guard, Shot by 3 Bank Robbers, Dies: Two Wounded, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19,
1929, at 3.
107 Abstract, supra note 64, at 140-41.
8 1d. at 310.
9 Id. at 311.
"0 Id. at 316.
...Id. at 316.
112 A letter in the files of the Parole and Pardon Board filed on behalf of Shadlow's co-
defendant, Leon Brown, stated that "Shadlow was knocked out by having two tables turned
so that their edges caught him at the sides of the neck, and then forced together until he be-
came strangled." Letter from Chester Rosborough to Parole and Pardon Board (July 8,
1930) (on file with author). See Abstract, supra note 64, at 141.
"' Id. at 67.
1 4 Id. at 80.
.5 Id. at 71.
"'16 Id. at 67.
17 Id. at 78.
[Vol. 92
2002] COOK COUNTY CRIMINAL PRACTICE IN 1929
would protect him, conferred with the State's Attorney and then re-
portedly confessed to the crime."'
Lafon Fisher testified at the hearing held outside the presence of
a jury that a police detective slapped him and kicked him in the shins
after he refused to make a statement and after Commissioner Stege 119
told him that the others "are squawking."'2 ° Fisher was then taken
into a small room where he was beaten and hit with a blackjack.
Fisher testified that, "when I couldn't stand it any longer I said I
would go before the state's attorney and implicate myself and the
others in the robbery."'' Fisher testified that he was told what to say
and that after the statement was given, he refused to sign it.' 2
When Fisher was brought before Commissioner Stege to sign his
statement, there were witnesses present, including bank employee
Alexander McKay. Mr. McKay testified that Fisher was asked to
make a statement in the presence of witnesses and that he refused to
i's Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Illinois' review of the convictions of the defen-
dants does not mention Shadlow's claim that he asked for a lawyer and that he was per-
suaded to make a statement after the police offered to allow Shadlow to speak to the State's
Attorney. See Fisher, 172 N.E. 743, 746. This omission is undoubtedly due to the fact that
the Court's inquiry focused on the voluntariness of the confession - not whether any of the
defendants had been tricked into confessing. Abstract, supra note 64, at 78.
119 John Stege was an experienced police investigator who pursued Al Capone during
Prohibition years. See generally, JOHN KOBLER, CAPONE: THE LIFE AND WORLD OF AL
CAPONE (1971).
120 Abstract, supra note 64, at 102.
121 Id. at 103.
122 In his affidavit in support of his motion for a severance of his trial from those of the
other defendants, Fisher stated that he was
beaten and tortured by certain police officers until he could no longer endure the suffering. He
also stated in his affidavit that he told one of the police officers that he would make a statement if
taken before Mr. Charles A. Bellows, Assistant State's Attorney; that he was shown a typewritten
statement purporting to have been signed by Leon Brown, by said officers; that he was then taken
by said police officers to a room where the aforesaid Charles A. Bellows was present with a ste-
nographer and other persons believed by this affiant to be newspaper reporters; that he made a
false statement to the said Charles A. Bellows, which statement was made by this affiant for the
sole purpose of avoiding further beating and torture at the hands of the said police officers.
Motion for Severance Filed by Lafon Fisher (Apr. 8, 1929) (on file with author). Fisher also
stated in this affidavit that he participated in the re-enactment of the crime at the Franklin
Bank and Trust because he was threatened with further physical violence. Id. In a letter to
the Board of Pardon and Parole, dated July 8, 1930, Chester R. Rosborough, identified as a
"white minister" from the Moody Bible Institute, stated that he had information indicating
that "Fisher was handcuffed at the wrists and again around the ankles and then hung upon a
hook or peg, head downward until he was ready to tell what the officers wanted to get." Let-
ter from Chester R. Rosborough to the Board of Pardons and Paroles (July 8, 1930) (on file
with author).
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do so, telling Commissioner Stege that he had already made a state-
ment. 23 Fisher also testified that Leon Brown, who told the police
that he couldn't read or write, was asked by detectives to adopt his
(Fisher's) statement. 124 In fact, Fisher's statement, a copy of which is
in the appellate record and in the records of the Board of Pardon and
Parole, contains a handwritten printed notation, "L. Brown."'
' 25
Brown's own statement reflects a signature of Leon Brown that is in
script, completely different from that of the printed "L. Brown" on
Fisher's statement.
26
Leon Brown, who Dixon later testified at trial had nothing to do
with the robbery, 127 testified at the mid-trial hearing on the defen-
dants' motion to suppress that he was beaten after he was taken into a
room in which the co-defendants were present. He said that after his
arrival at police headquarters, Commissioner Stege told him that the
123 Abstract, supra note 64, at 182.
124 Id. at 106.
125 Statement of Lafon Fisher (Jan. 19, 1929) (on file with author).
126 Id. at 316.
127 Steve Dixon was apprehended in Mississippi in April of 1930 after the trial of Shad-
low, Fisher, Brown, and Jenkins was completed. Shortly after his arrest, Dixon pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to natural life in prison. Dixon admitted having the shotgun and
signed a confession in which he admitted firing the shot that killed Martin French. Letter
from John A. Swanson, State's Attorney of Cook County, to Warden of the Illinois State
Penitentiary (July 1, 1930) (on file with author); Letter from Chester R. Rosborough to
Board of Pardons and Paroles (July 8, 1930) (on file with the author). In his letter of July 1,
1930 to the Warden, State's Attorney Swanson stated that French's death was "caused by
shotgun wounds discharged from the hand of Steve Dixon ..... Id.
As noted above, this was contrary to what the State argued at the trial of Shadlow and his
co-defendants. At that trial, the State argued that Shadlow fired the fatal shots. On June 28,
1930, after he pleaded guilty to the charge and was imprisoned, Dixon wrote a letter to the
Governor of Illinois pleading for Leon Brown's life, stating that Brown was innocent. Letter
from Steven Dixon to Governor Louis Emmerson (July 1, 1920) (on file with author).
Brown's case attracted considerable attention as his execution approached. An article in the
September 27, 1929 Chicago Defender stated, "Mr. Rosborough, a white minister of the
Moody Bible Institute appeared before the board and told the members that he had person-
ally interviewed Dixon and that Dixon had confessed, and that he, Dixon, had the shotgun
from which were fired the fatal slugs that caused the death of French .... At least 50 per-
sons appeared on behalf of the condemned youths. They were all prominent Chicagoans.
Among them was Mrs. Ida Wells-Barnett, prominent clubwoman. One group chartered a
special Greyhound bus." Bank Bandits Lose Appeal, to Die Friday, Oct. 3, CHI. DEFENDER
Sept. 27, 1930, at I. Despite the efforts of a group of concerned citizens who argued that
Brown was innocent, Brown was executed on November 28, 1930. A document in the files
of the Parole and Pardon Board, dated October 2, 1930, written by Mrs. D. E. Norman of the
Hope Haven League, states that Shadlow told her that Brown was not involved in the rob-
bery. Letter from D. E. Norman to Illinois Parole and Pardon Board (Nov. 11, 1926) (on file
with author). Brown, who testified at trial against the advice of his lawyer, presented an al-
ibi. Abstract, supra note 64, at 393. He was the only defendant who testified.
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others had identified him. Brown denied that he was involved.'28
Brown was taken to Shadlow, who Brown said, "did not look the
best."'129 According to Brown, Shadlow identified him as having been
involved in the robbery. Brown was again asked by police officers if
he "was ready to kick in."'30
Brown was then taken before Jenkins who implicated him.
Brown was asked again if he was ready to confess. He refused to
make a statement.'3' He was taken before Fisher who identified him
as a participant in the robbery. Brown persisted in his refusal to
make a statement. 32 Brown testified that he agreed to make a state-
ment only after he was hit on the elbow with a gun and hit on the
back with a blackjack.'33 Commissioner Stege also participated in the
beating.'34 He saw Lafon Fisher, who appeared to be injured. Brown
was asked if he wanted to go through what Fisher had just gone
through.' According to Brown, Fisher "didn't look good."'36 After
being beaten, Brown agreed to make a statement. He was taken to
see an Officer Cusak. Brown testified that he was told what to say. "37
During his testimony at trial, Brown stated that immediately
upon his arrest, he asked Lt. Barry for an attorney.' Brown testified
that he was given Lafon Fisher's statement to read and that Cusak
guided his hand as he printed, "L. Brown" on Fisher's statement.
Brown testified that Cusak told him what to say and how to act be-
fore Brown was interviewed by Commissioner Stege.'39 Brown also
testified that he did not make the statements attributed to him in the
statement that he was forced to sign. 40
Brown testified that when he was taken before Commissioner
Stege, he agreed to sign a statement in his own handwriting. Brown
128 Abstract, supra note 64, at 402.
129 id.
130 id.
'31 Id. at 119,403.
'
32 Id. at 404.
'
33 Id. at 121,404.
'
34 Id. at 404.
1
35 Id. at 405.
1
36 Id. at 121.
137 According to Brown, Cusak said, "Listen, do you know this is Commissioner Cusak
talking to you. I am known to make them talk regardless of whoever they are ... I have
made wops talk tougher than you will ever be." Id. at 405.
131 Id. at 400.




testified that he did so thinking, "maybe if I sign this paper in my
own handwriting I can tell it in a nice, decent way, the other one was
through force, that is why I signed it."'' Brown testified that he re-
sponded to the leading questions of Commissioner Stege and the
other police officers who were present. 142 After he signed the state-
ment, a photographer took a picture of Brown holding a pencil.'43
Herbert Hare, in whose house the robbery was allegedly planned,
and who provided the weapons used in the robbery, was granted a
separate trial."' He was found guilty and was sentenced to life in
prison in a trial that was severed from that of Fisher, Shadlow,
Brown, and Jenkins. In a handwritten statement made to the prison
authorities when he was committed to the penitentiary, Hare stated
that he was innocent and that "any lawyer know [sic] how they get
confessions in Chicago. What they put me through, I could not stand
.... "45 Hare did not testify at the hearing on the admissibility of the
confessions of Fisher, Shadlow and Brown.'46
b) How the Statements Were Obtained: The State's Version
The Assistant State's Attorneys and police officers who were
present during the taking of the statements from the defendants took
the stand and denied any misconduct. Although Officer Barry, the
policeman who arrested Shadlow, testified that Shadlow asked for a
lawyer'47 when he was taken to see Police Commissioner Stege,14 8
Barry denied that there was any abuse of Shadlow or of any of the
other suspects. 149 Barry testified that Stege asked Shadlow if speak-
ing to the State's Attorney would be all right.' 0 According to Officer
Barry, Shadlow said "yes" and then, while Stege called the State's
141 Id. at 407.
141 Id. at 408.
143 id.
144 See id. at 36 (Hare granted separate trial); Letter from John Swanson, State's Attor-
ney, to Hon. Elmer J. Green, Warden, State Penitentiary (June 7, 1929) (on file with author)
(giving details on Hare's involvement).
145 Records of the Board of Pardon and Paroles (Dec. 10, 1929) (on file with author).
146 See Abstract, supra note 65. It is noteworthy that Jenkins did not join his co-
defendants' motion to suppress their statements, nor did he testify about the circumstances
under which his statement was taken. This may have been because, unknown to his co-
defendants, Jenkins had arranged to plead guilty and to become a de facto witness against the
others through his testimony. See infra Part III. F.4 7Abstract, supra note 64, at 67, 259.
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Attorney, Shadlow admitted to him that he had been in the bank and
named Jenkins, Brown, Fisher, and Dixon as his accomplices.15' Af-
ter Shadlow confessed, Melvin Jenkins was brought in to see Stege.
Fisher and Brown were interviewed by Lt. Cusak after Shadlow and
Jenkins confessed. 52
Officer Cusak testified that Fisher showed no hesitancy in speak-
ing to him. According to Cusak, "[Fisher] said he was in it.""' Stege
then brought Brown in to see Cusak saying, "Here's another fellow. I
wish you would take his statement."' 54 Cusak testified that he told
Brown, "[I]n order to save a lot of unnecessary writing, we will read
[Fisher's] statement, and if there is anything that is not right, you tell
me."'55 According to Cusak, Brown read the statement that Fisher
had given and signed it, stating that Fisher's statement was true, ex-
cept for Fisher's statement regarding how long Fisher and Brown had
known each other.'56 Officer Dawe was present when Fisher and
151 id.
152 Id. at 72.
"5' Id. at 92.
154 Id.
"' Id. at 93.
156 At this point in the proceedings, Brown's attorney made a motion to produce the
statement allegedly signed by Brown. That request was denied by the court, the judge stat-
ing, "You know, I can't understand that this Court has any power to direct the state's attor-
ney to give up any exhibits before they are offered. In any case, whether it is criminal or
civil, this Court has no such power as I view it." Id. at 98.
If Fisher's statement, with Brown's signature on it, had been produced, the trial court and
defense counsel would have seen that the statement consisted of two pages, one with
Brown's printed signature, and another page with the name "Leon Brown" written out in en-
tirely different handwriting. One of the witnesses to the taking of Brown's statement said
that the printed version of Brown's signature was not the signature of Leon Brown. Id. at
240. See Handwritten Statements of Fisher and Brown (Jan. 19, 1929), infra app.A. This
would have been fertile ground for cross-examination of Cusak and of the other State's wit-
nesses at the hearing on admissibility of the confessions. At this hearing, Fisher testified that
Brown couldn't read or write and that Cusak made the letters for Brown. Abstract, supra
note 64, at 106. Brown testified that he told Cusak that he couldn't read or write, Id. at 123,
but admitted at the suppression hearing that he could in fact write. Brown testified that he
told Cusak he could not write because he did not want to sign a confession admitting a crime
that he did not commit. Id. at 128. Officer Dawe, an investigator who was present when
Brown signed Fisher's statement, stated that "Brown didn't say he couldn't write[;] he said
he was a poor writer." Id. at 276. Dawe did not see Cusak write the letters out for Brown. Id.
at 276.
The statements of the defendants were given to the defense after the judge ruled that they
were admissible. At that time, Fisher's lawyer made a motion to re-open the hearing on the
admissibility of the confessions, noting that Brown's "signatures" on the statements corrobo-
rated the testimony of the defendants. Id. at 147-48. That motion was denied. Id. at 148.
There was no reference to the two "signatures" of Leon Brown in the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois' opinion affirming the defendants' convictions. See Fisher, 172 N.E. 743.
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Brown were being interviewed by Cusak. Dawe testified that Brown
was brought in and was asked to attest to what Fisher had said. Dawe
testified that "Brown printed his name and that Fisher wrote his." '157
Dawe denied that Fisher was abused during his interrogation." 8
Commissioner Stege testified that Shadlow confessed first.'59
Shadlow told Stege who was with him during the robbery. 6 ' Then
the other defendants were brought in one by one.' 6' According to
Stege, they each admitted their participation when interviewed sepa-
rately. They were then brought together "and they all told their part in
conversation."'62 After talking to the four, Stege dispatched a squad
to look for "big boy," presumably Steve Dixon.'63 Although Stege
denied that Shadlow asked to speak to the State's Attorney, Stege did
testify that after dusk, Judge Swanson (then the State's Attorney of
Cook County) came to his office.'64 After that, statements were taken
from each defendant. Stege denied that the defendants were
beaten.'65 He also denied that Shadlow told him that he wanted an at-
torney. 66
Sgt. Barry, the officer who arrested the defendants at the house
on Wabash, testified that he took Shadlow to see Commissioner
Stege.'67 Barry testified that Shadlow told Stege that he was willing
to tell the truth but that he wanted an attorney.'68 Barry also had con-
tact with Jenkins. Jenkins took Barry to the location where Jenkins
had discarded his gun, a .45 automatic.'69 Barry also talked to Fisher.
157Abstract, supra note 64, at 274.
158 When Fisher was taken to the inquest on January 24, 1929, he was given the following
admonition by the coroner: "It is my duty to notify you anything that you may say may be
used for or against you, knowing that do you still wish to testify?" Fisher replied, "Not with-
out the advice of counsel." Id. at 275, 389, 390.
"' Id. at 278.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 77-78.
62 Id. at 78.
63 Id. at 279.
164 id.
65 Id. at 79.
166 Id. at 80.
1
67/d. at 259.
168 Barry's testimony was: "Shadlow was asked if he wanted an attorney. He said, 'I
would like one,' and Commissioner Stege said, 'How would the State's Attorney do?' So he
called the [S]tate's [A]ttorney and the [S]tate's [A]ttomey came over. Judge Swanson [the
State's Attorney] came over, and while Commissioner Stege called the [S]tate's [A]ttorney I
asked Shadlow how many boys or how many men were in this bank holdup that we locked
up and he said, '[W]ell, you have got three. There is still one out."' Id. at 259.
69 Id. at 260.
[Vol. 92
COOK COUNTY CRIMINAL PRACTICE IN 1929
Fisher told Barry that he gave three guns (the Savage automatic, the
nickel plated Savage, and the Smith & Wesson used in the robbery)
to Herbie Hare.'70 Hare was questioned about this fact.'7 ' The guns
were recovered from Hare's house.' Barry also talked to Brown
who admitted using two .38 caliber pistols.'73
The State also called civilian witnesses to establish the voluntari-
ness of the confessions. The Tribune reported that the police and
prosecutors brought in civilians to witness the confessions in order to
"prevent repudiations of the confessions later." '174 Bank employee
Alexander McKay witnessed the final confessions of Shadlow and
Brown. He testified that Fisher refused to make a statement when
brought before the civilian witnesses. McKay testified that Shadlow,
Brown, and Fisher appeared to be in good physical condition when he
saw them.' McKay testified that he did not know what happened to
these defendants before they made their final statements. 
76
Robert McEwen, a dentist who worked above the bank, testified
that he was present when Shadlow made his statement. McEwen
stated that Shadlow was brought into the room where Stege and Bel-
lows were present.'77 At first Shadlow said that he was the driver of
70 Id. at 264.
171 Interestingly, there was very little mention of Hare's role in the robbery at trial, even
though there was evidence to suggest that he planned the robbery, providing the weapons
used in the robbery and the house where the robbery was planned. The defendants were ar-
rested in Hare's rooming house. Id. at 261.
72 Id. at 262.
' Id. at 264.
174 Second Murder Charge Made Against Bank Robbery Chief supra note 71. ("Dr. John
Roy French, Dr. Robert McEwen, and John Geraghty, a coal dealer, witnessed the signing of
the confessions of Shadlow and the others. Deputy Stege explained that he took this precau-
tion to present repudiation of the confession later. Numerous photographs also were taken of
the prisoners by official police photographers, thus establishing a precedent in the handling
of criminal cases.")
75 Abstract, supra note 64, at 184.
176 The use of civilian witnesses to support the voluntariness of the confessions was an
obvious tactic employed by the police and prosecutors. It is noteworthy, however, that these
witnesses did not see the defendants until they were ready to confess. McKay even testified:
"I don't know what happened to Brown or to any of the defendants before they were brought
into Commissioner Stege's office that Saturday evening, January 19, when I saw them sign
certain statements." Abstract, supra note 64, at 184. The civilian witnesses played essentially
the same role a video tape of the confessions might play, corroborating the reliability of the
confession's content. Of course, the Chicago police limited the use of the independent wit-
ness in the same way they now limit video-tape use; they were barred from the interroga-
tions until the defendant agreed to confess. Id. at 199.
177 Also present were Mr. Solomon, Mr. McKay, Doctor French, and Officer Sullivan
(the court reporter). Id. at 223.
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the car and signed a statement to that effect.'78 Shadlow stated, before
he signed his first statement, that he had not been abused in any way.
Brown was then brought in.'79 Brown admitted that he had two guns
and that he fired shots in the bank after Martin French, the security
guard, opened fire. According to McEwen, Brown stated that he had
not been mistreated.'80 Fisher was then brought in and stated that he
did not feel well.' 8' Fisher also signed a statement.8 2 Jenkins was
then called in and admitted driving the car.8 3 Jenkins signed a state-
ment. McEwen testified that Jenkins said that he was not abused in
any way. 184
John French, another dentist who worked above the bank, and
the nephew of the victim, Martin French, was also called to testify at
the hearing on the defendants' motion to suppress statements. French
testified that he heard a commotion and went into the bank. He saw
his uncle on the ground. He put his uncle on a stretcher and in-
structed the ambulance driver to take his uncle to Mercy Hospital.
Later, at the police station, he had a conversation with Shadlow in
which Shadlow admitted being in the crowd when Martin French was
placed on the stretcher.' French testified that he was present when
Shadlow and Brown made their statements in the presence of Stege
and Bellows. He testified that Shadlow and Brown were not mis-
treated in his presence."' He also testified that he saw Brown sign
his statement. 18 7 Fisher was then brought in. Fisher admitted that he
had made a voluntary statement but refused to sign another state-
171 Id. at 224.
178 Id. at 227.
180 Id.
"1 Id. at 229.
182 McEwen spoke to Fisher during the reenactment of the crime at the bank. He told
Fisher that he was standing at his window, overlooking the sidewalk. McEwen told Fisher
that he could have shot them if he had a gun. According to McEwen's trial testimony, Fisher
told McEwen that he would have shot McEwen if he had seen him at the window. Id. at 235,
229.
183 Id. at 230.
'184 McEwen testified that he had a conversation with Jenkins at the re-enactment of the
crime during which he (McEwen) asked Jenkins how he got involved in the robbery. Ac-
cording to McEwen, Jenkins replied, "I don't know, doctor, it is just foolish, following
someone else." Id. at 230, 232.
"' Id. at 248.
186 Id. at 250.
187 Id.
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ment.' s According to French, Fisher stated, "I have already made a
statement. My head aches." ' 9
2. Ruling on Admissibility of the Confession
The trial court judge denied the motion to suppress the state-
ments, ruling that the testimony of the police officers and civilian
witnesses established that the confessions were voluntary.
The Supreme Court of Illinois gave short shrift to the defendants'
contention that their confessions were coerced, relying completely on
the trial court's ruling that the confession were voluntary.
The finding of the court that the confessions were voluntarily made is as-
sumed as error. We are of the opinion, under the circumstances here de-
tailed and the testimony appearing before the court at that time, that it
was justified in the conclusion that the confessions were voluntary.190
Illinois courts were not alone in their refusal to acknowledge that
the "third degree" was often employed by police and prosecutors to
obtain confessions. 9' Where the question of whether coercion oc-
curred depended upon the resolution of credibility both between po-
lice and prosecutors on the one hand and the defendant on the other,
the police and prosecutors always won.'92 Only recently have Illinois
courts taken a closer look at this issue. Illinois courts now permit the
defendant to establish a habit or routine practice or modus operandi
of police abuse of suspects, following a path-breaking decision by
Justice Warren Wolfson.1
93
The Illinois Supreme Court did not address the question of
whether Shadlow had asked for an attorney. Defendants were not en-
titled, under the law at that time, to have counsel present during an
"'8 Id. 252.
19 Id. 254.
"0 Fisher, 172 N.E. at 751.
191 "[T]he local courts almost always resolved the almost inevitable 'swearing contest'
over what happened behind closed doors in favor of the police perhaps for the reasons sug-
gested by Walter Schaeffer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure: 'In the field of
criminal procedure [a] strong local interest competes only against an ideal. Local interest is
concerned with the particular case and with the guild or innocence of the particular individ-
ual ... while it is hard indeed for any judge to set apart the question of the guilt or innocence
of a particular defendant and focus solely upon the procedural aspects of the case, it becomes
easier [in] a reviewing court when the impact of the evidence is diluted."' YALE KAMISAR
ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 444 (1 0 th ed. 2002)(citation omitted).
192 "Almost no garden variety criminal defendant who cried 'coerced confession' but lost
the 'swearing contest' below was likely to survive the winnowing process above." Id. at 445.
193 People v. Cannon, 688 N.E.2d 693 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997).
2002]
THOMAS F. GERAGHTY
interrogation.'94 Moreover, criticism of police practices that involved
"trickery and deceit" was uncommon. Recall that Shadlow asked for
an attorney. He was asked if the "State's Attorney" would do. Police
Commissioner Stege must have known that the State's Attorney
would not have acted on behalf of Shadlow and intended to lull Shad-
low into a false sense of security. Indeed, after Shadlow consulted
with Assistant State's Attorney Bellows, the Tribune reported that
Police Commissioner Stege announced that he would try to save
Shadlow's life after consulting with State's Attorney Swanson. 195
The "trickery" apparently employed by Commissioner Stege and
the State's Attorney's office to induce Shadlow to confess was pre-
cisely the kind condemned in Miranda and was part of the basis for
the Miranda Court's promulgation of prophylactic rules:
When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police
may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. It is
important to keep the suspect off balance, for example, by trading on his
insecurity about himself or his surrounding. The police then persuade,
trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
Even without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or the specific
stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation ex-
ults a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of indi-
viduals. 96
D. PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY
As noted above, the apprehension of the suspects in the Franklin
Trust robbery was the subject of much newspaper publicity. The de-
fendants were paraded before newspaper reporters, their interroga-
tions were witnessed by ordinary citizens, and the re-enactment of
the crime was front page news.
The papers were full of reports about the incident and the ensur-
ing investigation. Reporters were present when the statements were
made; the fact that the defendants confessed, as well as what they
said, was reported in detail in the papers.
The State made a calculated decision to seek publicity. The
prosecutor's strategy in this regard was very clear. Immediately after
the defendants' confession, newspaper photographers took pictures of
the defendants holding the pencils used to sign the confession. The
194 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
195 Second Murder Charge Made Against Bank Robbery Chief supra note 71, at 1.
196 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).
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photograph was staged by the prosecutor. The papers covered and
photographed the defendants' re-enactment of the crime.197 The con-
duct of the prosecutor in seeking the publicity generated by the case
would violate modem legal standards regarding pre-trial publicity. 198
The defendants made a motion for a change of venue over the
objection of their lawyer. The motion cited the alleged prejudice of
judges to whom the case might be assigned rather than the impossi-
bility of obtaining a fair trial from a Chicago jury.'99 The defense
lawyers did not make a motion for change of venue based upon juror
prejudice as the result of the extensive pre-trial publicity even though
the trial took place only four months after the bank robbery."' There
is no explanation for this strategic choice, other than the fact that at
the time of this trial, the law regarding the effects of pre-trial public-
ity on juror decision-making was not well-developed.' It is also
possible that the defense lawyers decided that three African Ameri-
can defendants were more likely to receive a fair trial in Chicago than
in less racially diverse counties outside of Cook County.2
197 MOLEY, supra note 1. In a chapter of his book entitled "Trial By City Desk," Moley
expressed concern that "[w]hen the attitude created by the newspaper accounts is hostile to
the defendant, the tendency is to destroy the practical value of the presumption of innocence
.... Id. at 193.
198 See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) ("A lawyer who is participating
or who has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extra-
judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication if the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, that it will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding on the matter.")
199 See Motion for a Change of Venue (Apr. 6, 1929) (on file with author). The motion
alleged that: "your petitioner has insisted upon his attorney preparing and filing a petition for
a change of venue, but that the said attorney has refused to prepare and file the petition for a
change of venue, and only consented to prepare the petition for a change of venue and the
Affidavits in support thereof ... after your petitioner threatened to inform the court that his
said attorney had refused to prepare the said petition ... ." Id.
200 Notice of Motion for Change of Venue, People v. Fisher (on file with author).
201 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Ridean v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Patten v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
202 It appears that the jury was sequestered during the 8-day trial. However, after the ver-
dict was announced, it was discovered that during jury deliberations, members of the jury,
without the knowledge of the judge or the lawyers involved in the case, left the jury quarters
at the new courthouse at 2 6th and California to obtain food, clean clothes, and a radio. A
post-trial petition filed by the defendants alleged that the jury heard highly prejudicial re-
ports over the radio concerning the criminal backgrounds of the defendants. Affidavit of
Richard E. Westbrooks (on file with author). This affidavit has no date, but was sworn out




Fisher asked for a separate trial, alleging that it was improper to
try him with the other defendants who had made confessions impli-
cating him. 23 Fisher also filed a pre-trial motion arguing that he
should be given a separate trial because his defense was antagonistic
to that of the other defendants. 4 In this motion, Fisher asked for the
production of the statements of the other co-defendants. The motion
also alleged that he had been beaten and tortured by police officers.
He alleged that he made the statement in order to avoid further tor-
ture.2"6 He further alleged in this motion that the reenactment of the
crime was coerced.2 7
The court denied the motion for a separate trial and motion for
production of the statements, stating, "I do not think that I have a
right to require the state to produce the confessions. 2 8  There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the judge saw the defendants'
statements before he ruled on the motion for severance. Thus, when
he denied Fisher's motion, he did so without knowing whether the
defendants' statements were, in fact, antagonistic.
The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected Fisher's claim that he was
denied a fair trial as the result of the trial court's adverse ruling on his
motion for severance, holding that the confessions were not "antago-
nistic" and that the "confessions were.., in substance identical to the
others .... "209 The Supreme Court of Illinois also relied upon its
203 The motion alleged that:
the state's attorney has expressed his intention to introduce said statements [the
statements of the co-defendants] in evidence at trial; that said statements, admis-
sions, and confessions were made outside the presence of Lafon Fisher, and are in-
competent evidence as to the defendant Lafon Fisher, and will be prejudicial to the
defendant, Lafon Fisher, and will deprive him of a fair and impartial trial ... and the
state relies wholly upon the prejudicial effect of cumulative evidence, incompetent
as against the defendant Lafon Fisher.
Abstract, supra note 64, at 8.
204 Id. at 16.
205 Id. at 14.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 11.
209 Fisher, 172 N.E. at 749.
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conclusion that there was no prejudice because the defendants' state-
ments were consistent with each other.21 °
This finding of consistency was basically correct in so far as the
statements of Shadlow, Fisher and Brown were concerned. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court's ruling was manifestly incorrect as it applied to
Jenkins' statement. Throughout the trial the defendants' lawyers, ex-
cept for Jenkins' lawyer, were careful to make objections for the re-
cord asking the judge to instruct the jury that statements of the other
defendants not be considered by the jury as evidence against their cli-
ents. As the Supreme Court held in Bruton, and in cases following
Bruton, it is virtually impossible for a jury to live by such admoni-
tions.21' This was especially true in this case, in which the four de-
fendants each made statements that were summarized by numerous
police and lay witnesses and which were introduced into evidence
without any redactions.
Although the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the defendants
did not present antagonistic defenses, Jenkins' defense (if, indeed it
could have been characterized as a "defense") was clearly at odds
with that of Brown, who testified that he had nothing to do with the
robbery. The defendants' attorneys presumed that they had no right to
cross-examine Jenkins because he was a co-defendant.
1 2
Jenkins, the only defendant who went to trial in the Fisher,
Brown, Shadlow and Jenkins trial who did not receive the death pen-
alty, testified that he was present at the robbery but did not participate
in the shooting. He testified that he ran away from the bank after he
2 10 The history of confrontation clause jurisprudence is long, complicated, and beyond the
scope of this article. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Supreme Court
held that a defendant is prejudiced when a co-defendant's statement is introduced against
him, even when a limiting instruction is given. Redaction of a co-defendants' statements is
effective only when the out of court statement contains no identifiable reference to the non-
testifying defendants. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987); Gray v. Maryland, 523
U.S. 185 (1998). A non-testifying co-defendant's statement that is not otherwise admissible
in evidence is not made admissible because it is consistent with the defendant's statement.
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
211 See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137; See also Cruz, 481 U.S. 186, holding that Parker v.
Randolph, 442 U.S.62 (1979) (the admission of defendants' "interlocking" confessions do
not violate the Bruton rule) was wrongly decided in light of Bruton. Thus, under Cruz, the
Fisher defendants would have been entitled to separate trials. The Supreme Court has re-
affirmed its adherence to Bruton, holding that redaction of a defendant's name from a co-
defendant's statement must be done with great care to ensure that the co-defendant's state-
ment is not accusatory as to the defendant. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 193-93.
212 Mr. Lofton, attorney for Lafon Fisher, stated: "I understand under the law we have a
right to cross-examine on what the state introduces but not to cross-examine another defen-
dant." Abstract, supra note 64, at 384.
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heard the first shot fired. He had a gun in his pocket, which he threw
away in an alley.213 Jenkins admitted driving to the bank with two
other people. 14 Jenkins testified that there were two shotguns in the
car. 21 He also testified that he went to the bank with a gun and that
he knew he was going to participate in the hold-up of a bank.216 He
was not permitted to name the other participants in the robbery.
217
On cross-examination of Jenkins, the State accomplished by
clear implication that which it could not prove. Instead of asking Jen-
kins who was with him during the robbery, Prosecutor Brooks estab-
lished that Jenkins' statement to the police was reliable. Jenkins also
testified on cross-examination that the statement that he gave to the
police was read to him before he signed it. 218 When asked whether the
statement (which implicated the other co-defendants) was true, Jen-
kins' attorney interrupted and stated, "And he didn't deny it. He
keeps saying, 'wasn't that true?' and he never said that it wasn't
true." 9 On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court, on its
own motion, should have ordered a separate trial for Jenkins because
Jenkins implicated the others. The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected
this contention.
20
Later, Jenkins himself claimed that he had been prejudiced by the
joint trial. In a petition for executive clemency he claimed that "dur-
ing trial all of the extenuating circumstances [of his participation in
the robbery] which might have been favorable to [him] were sub-
merged under the weight of prejudicial evidence presented against
the other members of the group which were on trial.
221
It was not until 1968, in Bruton, thirty-eight years after the
Fisher trial, that the Supreme Court identified the prejudice that could
result from the admission of a co-defendant's statement against a
non-testifying defendant, and only recently in Gray v. Maryland222
was the Bruton doctrine was further refined.
213 Id. at 382.
214 Id. at 387.
... Id. at 384.
2 16 Id. at 383.
217 Id. at 385.
211 Id. at 387.
219 Abstract, supra note 65, at 387.
220 Answer to Petition for Rehearing, Sup. Ct. of Ill., Apr. 18, 1930, 14-15 (on file with
author).
221 Application for Executive Clemency Filed by Melvin Jenkins (Dec. 3, 1946) (on file
with author).
222 Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998).
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F. JENKINS' "GUILTY PLEA"
The lawyers for the other co-defendants argued that Jenkins,
who did not contest the evidence at trial, and who, in effect, testified
against the other defendants, presented a defense antagonistic to that
of his co-defendants. Moreover, Jenkins' lawyer did not cross-
examine any of the state's witnesses, sending a message to the jury
that he did not dispute the evidence presented against the defendants.
Jenkins' lawyer made his theory of the case clear in his closing
argument: Jenkins never entered the bank and ran away before the
shots fatal to French were fired. Jenkins had no prior record. Jenkins'
lawyer argued, in closing, "he doesn't deserve death, and I am not
asking you to turn him loose. How is that? I am not asking you to do
it, although under the law, you can if you want to." '223 Jenkins' lawyer
went on to beg for mercy for his client, promising that Jenkins would
testify against Hare at Hare's later trial:
If you are merciful in this case, I assure you that the State will vouch for
his veracity when Herbie's trial gets to going. I assure you that they
won't ask you to believe he was there, when French was killed because
he wasn't, he wasn't.
224
After Jenkins' lawyer completed his closing argument, the law-
yers for Shadlow, Brown, and Fisher asked for a mistrial, arguing that
Jenkins' lawyer had argued that their clients were guilty. Jenkins' co-
defendants also argued that by stating that Jenkins was able to take
the stand because he had no criminal record to hide, Jenkins' lawyer
implied that the other defendants had criminal records. The trial
judge denied these motions for mistrial. 5
In post-trial motions, and in their brief filed in the Supreme
Court of Illinois, Shadlow, Brown, and Fisher argued that the State
made a secret deal with Jenkins. The defendants alleged that in return
for Jenkins' testimony, the State agreed not to argue vigorously that
Jenkins should be put to death. The State denied making such a deal,
pointing out the fact that it asked in closing argument that Jenkins be
sentenced to death. 226 Although Prosecutor Brooks did ask that
Jenkins receive the same penalty as the other defendants, he reserved
223 Abstract, supra note 64, at 450.
224 Id. at 454.
121/d. at 458.
226 Prosecutor Brooks, in opposing the defendants' motion for mistrial after Jenkins' clos-
ing argument, stated "Let the record ... reflect show that the state now states to the court
that we have no agreement with the defendant Jenkins and that we will ask for the death
penalty on behalf of Jenkins, the same as the other defendants." Id. at 459. In fact, Brooks
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kins receive the same penalty as the other defendants, he reserved the
bulk of his closing argument for strident condemnation of Shadlow,
Brown, and Fisher. Brooks paid little attention to Jenkins in his clos-
ing argument.227
That Jenkins made a deal with the prosecutors is supported by
her testimony at this 1953 parole hearing. There, Jenkins testified
that he plead guilty to the charges for which his co-defendants re-
ceived the death penalty. At that parole hearing, the following ex-
change took place between the Parole Board and Jenkins:
Q. Did you plead guilty, Melvin?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. All the rest of your fellows, were they tried, or did they plead guilty?
A. Four of them were tried together, see, it was, I pleaded guilty and 3
asked for trials. They tried the one [Hare], then they caught one and tried
him [Dixon] last. The one they caught last was about a year later.228
Thus, twenty-three years after his co-defendants were executed,
Jenkins corroborated his co-defendants' assertion that he made a deal
with the State in order to avoid the death penalty and possibly, to en-
sure that he would eventually be released from prison. Though he in
fact did not plead guilty in any formal way (Jenkins was found guilty
by the jury), Jenkins' 1953 testimony before the Parole Board sug-
gests that he thought he pleaded guilty.
Assuming that the lawyers for Fisher, Shadlow, and Brown were
intentionally deceived by the State about whether Jenkins had made a
deal to avoid the death penalty, were his co-defendants prejudiced?
The answer is surely yes. When Jenkins testified, the lawyers for his
did argue that Jenkins deserved the death penalty: "It was too hot for Jenkins then and it is
too hot now. But he is just as guilty as the rest of them except he is a coward. Jenkins ran
away. Where do we find Jenkins next? We find him with Herbie Hare. We find him at
Dixon's home." Id. at 475.
227 See Abstract, supra note 65, at 460-82 (quoting the closing argument of Wayland
Brooks).
228 Parole and Pardon Board Hearing, Oct. 27, 1953, at 4 (on file with the author). Jenkins
was paroled from prison in 1954. When paroled, he was fifty years old and had spent over
twenty-five years in prison. The parole board member who recommended parole stated that
Jenkins' institutional record had been perfect since 1946. He had participated in a malaria
program and a salmonella program. Parole and Pardon Board Hearing, Oct. 29, 1954, at 7
(on file with the author). Jenkins successfully completed parole in 1959. Letter to Thomas
O'Brien, Superintendent, Paroles and Pardon Board from T. Edward Austin Superintendent,
Supervision of Parolees, Oct. 23, 1959 (on file with the author). In his Application for Clem-
ency or Commutation of Sentence, Jenkins stated that Shadlow fired the shotgun blast that
killed French. Application of Melvin Jenkins For Clemency or Commutation of Sentence (on
file with author).
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co-defendants were unable to show that Jenkins' testimony was pro-
cured by an agreement with the State. Evidence of an agreement be-
tween Jenkins and the state would have undermined the credibility of
Jenkins' testimony.
If the prosecutors misled the defendants and the court about the
existence of a deal with Jenkins, it may have been because in 1929 its
duty to produce such evidence had not been established. Brady v.
Maryland29 first established the State's duty to disclose further evi-
dence. The duty to disclose impeachment evidence consisting of
deals, promises, or inducements under the Brady doctrine was clearly
established only in 1985.230
G. PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY
The most notable instance of limited discovery was the fact that
the State was not required to produce the statements of the defendants
before trial. Indeed, the defendants were not even permitted to see
their written statements until after they were offered and received into
evidence.2 1 The defendants repeatedly asked that their statements be
produced prior to their introduction at trial and raised the fact that the
statements were not produced as a point for reversal on appeal. In re-
jecting this argument, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
Nor was it the right of plaintiffs in error on that hearing [the hearing on
the admissibility of the confessions] to have the confessions or a steno-
graphic report of them, produced, as the only question involved was
whether the confessions were voluntary. Refusing to produce them was
not suppression of evidence on the part of the State's attorney. They
were later offered on the trial, and the court instructed the jury, as to each
of them, that it was admitted only as to the defendant making it; that any-
thing therein stated relating to any other of the defendants than the one
signing the confession could not be considered as evidence against such
other defendant. An instruction to that same purport was given to the jury
on the giving of instructions. In a case such as the instant case, where all
of the defendants made voluntary confessions which were in substance
the same, and which confessions, though implicating the others, were
229 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
230 id.
231 Illinois' criminal code first included a requirement that statements of defendants be
turned over to the defense in 1964. See ILL REv. STAT. CH. 38 § 114-10 (1964). Similar
provisions exist in all states and also govern federal prosecutions. "Historically, the written
or recorded statement of the defendants was one of the first items included in the defendants
right to discovery." KAMiSAR, ET AL, supra note 190, at 1190.
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likewise confessions of their own acts, it was not error to admit them as a
whole in evidence.232
The defendants, in their Petition for Re-Hearing before the Su-
preme Court of Illinois, eloquently rebutted the assertion that the de-
fendants were not prejudiced by their inability to gain access to their
confessions before trial:
May we not observe that a confession reduced to writing is the best evi-
dence of its contents and it being the duty of the Court out of the pres-
ence of the jury to determine its admissibility, the instrument itself must
be submitted to the Court and counsel in order that any erasures, inter-
lineations, explanations, peculiarities, appearing on the face thereof
might be inquired about and all witnesses may be examined and cross
examined concerning same .... May we ask how the Court can deter-
mine the admissibility of a written instrument without having the instru-
ment before it; how the attorneys for the defendant can cross examine
the witnesses for the state concerning the execution of the particular in-
strument with out having the instrument before them.233
The defendants also noted in their petition to note the particular
prejudice to Brown that resulted from his statement being unavailable
to the judge and to the defense prior to trial, and even prior to and
during the hearing on the admissibility of his confession:
An inspection of the Peoples Exhibit 4234 will disclose the signature of
Leon Brown, also People's Exhibit 6235 will show the signature of L.
Brown which was testified to on the preliminary hearing as being the
signature of the plaintiff in error Leon Brown. Neither the court nor
counsel for the plaintiff in error were in a situation to cross examine any
witnesses concerning the difference in the signatures nor the difference
in the contents of the confessions, as the state's attorney refused to pro-
duced the same, and the court held that he was not aware that he had any
power to compel their production. The court has overlooked the fact that
the confessions were not produced until after the issue of their compe-
tency had been fully passed upon by the court; that the printed signature
as it appears on People's Exhibit 6 corroborated the testimony of Leon
Brown before the court that he had disguised his handwriting, and denied
to the officers his ability to write, in order that he might thereby demon-
strate when the confession was later produced that he did not voluntarily
sign it.13 6 The document itself, People's Exhibit 6, impeached the testi-
232 Fisher, 172 N.E. at 751.
233 Defendants' Petition for Rehearing 23 (Mar. 18, 1930) (on file with author).
234 Photostated in Abstract, supra note 64, at 316.
23 1 d. at 322.
236 Id. at 123.
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mony of Officer Cusak before the court, who testified that the signature
was not printed on the confession; that he had no conversation with
Brown in reference to his ability to read and write.
237 Where the issue be-
fore the court on the question of what transpired in that squad room be-
came a question of veracity between the defendant and the police
officers, who were the only ones present at the taking of these prelimi-
nary statements of Fisher and Brown, can this court say that the confes-
sion on its face was not material?
238
The 6perative rationale for not turning over defendants' state-
ments, although not relied upon by the Illinois Supreme Court, was
stated in the prosecution's answer to the defendants' petition for re-
hearing:
Plaintiffs in error cite no cases or authority and we can think of none that
holds that the state must furnish them a copy of a confession which they
say they made. One would presume that they were sufficiently informed
of what they said without further information, especially when they are
insisting that the confession made by them were obtained by duress and
239
promises of clemency.
The unfairness of the position taken by the state is apparent on its
face and has been unanimously repudiated by courts and legislatures.
Implicit in the rationale advanced by the State was the assumption
that the defendants' statements would be recorded accurately. How-
ever, when recorded statements are made available, as they are today,
allegations that such statements are recorded inaccurately or are oth-
erwise unreliable are routinely made. Videotaping of interrogations is
a means of resolving the reliability issue. Recently, the State's At-
torney of Cook County has instituted procedures requiring that state-
ments in murder cases be videotaped. However, this measure does
not require that the entire interrogation be videotaped, a measure that
would provide even more data upon where to base determination of
voluntariness and reliability.
240
237 Id. at 96, 97.
238 Defendants' Petition for Rehearing 25 (Mar. 18, 1930) (on file with author).
239 Answer to Petition for Rehearing 32 (Apr. 18, 1930), (on file with author).
240 See Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Role: Mandatory Video-
Taping of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32 Loy.
U. Chi. L.J. 337 (2001); Wayne T. Westling & Vicki Waye, Video Taping Police Interroga-
tion: Lessons from Australia, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 493 (1998); Wayne T. Westling, Something




H. THE RELIABILITY OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
1. The Presence of Witnesses at the Taking of the Defendants' Confessions
The reliability of the identifications made in this case is called
into question by the presence of key eyewitnesses during the taking
of the defendants' confessions and the presence of key eyewitnesses
during the re-enactment of the crime. While there is little doubt that
at least some, or perhaps even most, of the defendants charged were
present during the robbery, the eyewitness identifications of the de-
fendants and their accounts of the roles that the defendants played in
the robbery must have been influenced by the fact that the key wit-
nesses were present when the confessions were made and during the
re-enactment. During the re-enactment of the crime, witnesses were
also allowed to speak to the defendants, eliciting key admissions
from them.
The presence of the eyewitnesses at the taking of the confessions
and during the re-enactment undoubtedly influenced the witness'
identification testimony at trial. Dr. McEwen attended the inquest. He
did not pick anybody out at the inquest or at the Stanton Avenue Po-
lice Station where he observed the defendants sign their statements.241
He did not see anybody pick out Brown at the Stanton Avenue Police
Station. At the re-enactment, McEwen saw Brown standing with the
others in handcuffs before the police asked the defendants to take
their positions. He also spoke to Brown without obtaining permission
from the police officers.242 Geraghty identified Shadlow at the
Stanton Avenue police station.243 He did not identify Brown.244
241 Abstract, supra note 64, at 244.
242 Id. at 245.
243 Id. at 258.
244 No clear record was made as to how the identification of Shadlow was made, whether
Shadlow was identified out of a group or whether he was shown to witnesses alone. Sgt.
Barry testified that 21 men had been taken from Hare's house on Wabash. It is not clear if
Geraghty identified Shadlow from among that group or if Shadlow was brought before Ger-
aghty individually. Barry testified: "I had 21 suspects and I might have shown the whole
twenty one to Mr. Geraghty. Maybe I did. He had an opportunity to see all of them. I don't
know if Mr. Jahn came that morning, too. He had an opportunity to see all of them if he
came over there, I don't know. I don't think that Miss Wissig [an employee of the bank who
testified at trial] did see these men before the inquest ... I don't know, but I believe I did
show all twenty-one to any one from the bank who came to the station." Id. at 270. Geraghty
was also asked to identify all of the defendants before the inquest. He could only identify
Shadlow. Id. at 268, 270.
[Vol. 92
COOK COUNTY CRIMINAL PRACTICE IN 1929
Brown testified at trial that he was taken to the hospital to be
identified by the two witnesses who were wounded in the robbery.
24
Even when Brown told those witnesses that he was involved in the
robbery (pursuant to Stege's instructions), those witnesses failed to
identify him.246 Brown testified that McKay, one of the witnesses to




Sgt. Barry testified that after the defendants confessed, Commis-
sioner Stege asked them "if they would be willing to go out the next
day and show him how the crime was committed, and they said they
would."'24 On the day after the robbery, Jenkins, Shadlow, Brown,
and Fisher were taken to the bank, along with a police photogra-
pher. 249 According to one report, the defendants showed signs of hav-
ing been abused.25 The defendants were asked to take the guns that
they used and to stand where they stood during the robbery. 21 Barry
held the guns. Brown took two .38 revolvers. Fisher took the .32
automatic. Jenkins took a .45 automatic. Shadlow took the .32 caliber
pistol.252 Barry was asked who took the shotgun. Barry replied, "I
gave that to Sgt. Booth, and Sgt. Booth went over in a comer, where
Brown said that a man by the name of Dixon was standing. '253 Also
present during the re-enactment were Commissioner Stege, Mr. Solo-
mon, Mr. Straus, Sgt. Booth, Officer Olson, Mr. McKay, and Ms.
Wissig.
254
141 Id. at 413.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 416.
141 Id. at 265.
249 id.
250 Bauman explains,
The four not only confessed, under police beating, but agreed to re-enact the deadly event.
Bruised, black-eyed, manacled, and under heavy guard, they were taken back to the bank, where
unloaded revolvers were placed in their hands. Various employers assumed the duties they were
occupied with at the moment the robbers burst in.
BAUMAN, supra note 3, at 286.
251 Abstract, supra note 64, at 265.
252 Id. at 266.
253 Abstract, supra note 64, at 266.
254 Id. at 267.
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Brown testified at trial that he did not want to participate in the
re-enactment. He participated only after Stege came into the room
and slapped him a couple of times. 255 According to Brown, Stege told
him where to stand at the bank 256 and which pistols to claim.257 Brown
testified that there were fifty people in the bank during the re-
enactment and a crowd of two hundred to three hundred looking in.256
Brown denied telling Shadlow where to stand. However, Brown ad-
mitted having a conversation with McEwen. Brown denied admitting
to McEwen that he was present in the bank during the robbery.2 9
William C. Jahn, a teller at the bank, made identifications at trial
not made earlier, after seeing the re-enactment. Before the trial, at the
coroner's hearing, Jahn testified that he did not get a good look at the
men who entered the bank.26 He testified at the Coroner's inquest
that he was looking at the gun that was pointed at him, not the facial
features of the robber.2 1' Despite his earlier testimony at the inquest,
Jahn identified Fisher and Brown at trial as two men he saw with
guns in the bank.262 He also testified as to the re-enactment. He testi-
fied that during the reenactment,
Brown stood at the front of the cages with two guns, revolvers, and
Fisher vaulted over the top of the cage the way he had on the 18th. I saw
Shadlow in the bank on January 20th. He was standing towards the south
side of the bank with a revolver in his hand near Mr. Olson's desk, half-
way between that and Mr. McKay. I saw Melvin Jenkins there at that
time. He was standing in the doorway with an army automatic pistol in
his hand. 2 63 Jahn also testified to a conversation he had with Fisher at
the re-enactment. According to Jahn, Fisher admitted being in the bank
with a gun and said, "Oh, I wouldn't have shot you, I could have got you
some other way., 264 Jahn testified that he went to the police station on
the day after the robbery, that he was shown a number of persons who
were in custody, and that he did not identify anyone.265




7 Id. at 412.
2581d. at 410.
259 Id. at 413.
26o1d. at 157.
26 1 At the coroner's inquest, Mr. Jahn was asked," At any time did you notice his [the de-
fendant who vaulted over the teller's cage to scoop up the money] face?" Jahn replied, "I did
not sir." Id. at 158, 390.
.../d. at 155.
263 Id. at 155-56.
264 Id. at 156.
265 Id. at 157.
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The identification procedures employed by the police were un-
questionably suggestive, arguably so unnecessarily suggestive as to
be "conducive to irreparable mistaken identification," thus constitut-
ing a due process violation under modem-day constitutional criminal
procedure. 66
I. PROMPT PRESENTMENT TO A JUDICIAL OFFICER
The defendants were arrested on January 18, 1929. They were
not "booked" until after the inquest on January 24, 1929.267 Accord-
ing to Sgt. Barry, "[t]he lockup people had charge of the prisoners,
and won't permit any one to see them until they are booked.
268
Commissioner Stege testified that the defendants were brought to his
office at about 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. on January 19, 1929 and were there
continuously until January 29th when they finally went to court. 69
During this time, the defendants were interrogated, made statements,
re-enacted the crime, and attended an inquest. No reason is apparent
from the record suggesting why the defendants were not taken to
court sooner. The length of time between arrest and presentment to
the judge was excessive by any standard. However, the Supreme
Court did not require a prompt determination of probable cause until
1975 when it decided Gerstein v. Pugh.270 Only in 1991 did the Su-
preme Court define "prompt" as 48 hours.27'
J. AGGRAVATION/MITIGATION
Under Illinois law at the time of the defendant's trials, the jury in
the murder case had the option of sentencing the defendant to death,
to life in prison, or to a fixed term of years in prison. The jury was
given no guidance in making this awesome decision other than the
arguments of counsel. No instruction laid out factors in "aggravation
and mitigation." Indeed, those terms were not even referenced during
the trial. The defense lawyers for the defendants argued only
guilt/innocence during their closing arguments, while the prosecution
argued that the defendants were guilty and that they should be put to
death. Also adding to the uncertainty regarding the standards that the
266 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
267 Id. at 267.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 280.
270 420 U.S. at 103 (1975).
271 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
272 Jury Verdict Form (on file with author).
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jury should apply at sentencing, the judge orally instructed the venire
prior to trial as follows:
In any case where you find a man guilty, this court always has the right
and opportunity of setting that verdict aside, or if the punishment is ex-
cessive and the facts in the case do not warrant that the punishment fixed
by the statute should be carried out to a defendant found guilty by you.
This court has the right to put the defendant on probation.
The judge further instructed the venire that "[e]very defendant
found guilty and sent to the penitentiary for one year, or ten years, or
life, or whatever number of years, may be paroled after eleven
months." '273
The defendants objected to this instruction, arguing that it al-
lowed the jury to believe that any mistake it might make including a
mistaken decision to sentence a defendant to death, would be cor-
rected by the trial judge. The defendants argued on appeal: "May we
suggest that both the power of the trial judge to set aside verdicts, and
his power to grant probation are subject to very definite limitations
which were not explained to the jury...274
The Supreme Court, in rejecting this argument, relied on the fact
that although the defense lawyers objected to the court's remarks,
they did not move to discharge the jurors who had heard the offend-
ing instruction, nor did defense counsel exhaust their peremptory
challenges.175 The Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
As we have seen the only remarks objected to were those herein quoted,
and it is evident that the jury could not have construed them as having
application to this case. Likewise it is apparent from the reading of the
statements of the court with the reference to the right of the court to set
aside the verdict, that they related to those cases in which the jury has
nothing to do with the punishments and would be so construed by the
jury. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the statements made could not
have prejudiced the plaintiffs in error.
276
This argument, perhaps the strongest one on appeal, would have
most certainly prevailed today. In fact, as the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois conceded, the judge did misstate the law as it applied to death
penalty cases. 277 Neither at the trial nor at appeal did the State argue
273 id.
274 Petition for Rehearing 3 (Mar. 18, 1930) (on file with author).
275 Fisher, 172 N.E.2d at 755.
276 Id. at 746.
277 id.
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that the judge properly stated the law. Moreover, in this case, because
of its seriousness and the degree of public attention it received, the
judge could not possibly have contemplated overturning the jury's
death sentence. Why he gave those instructions remains a mystery.
The trial record does not include reference to what we would
now call "mitigation." '278 There was no separate sentencing hearing.
The jury was simply instructed that after a finding of guilty, it could
impose a sentence of death, a sentence of natural life, or a sentence of
a fixed term of years.279 A simple verdict form gave the jury those op-
tions.28° In closing argument, the prosecutor made little reference to
the criminal backgrounds of the defendants, although each, except for
Jenkins, had criminal records. Instead, Brooks contrasted the lives of
the defendants with those, like himself, had marched off to World
War I:
Gentlemen, do you think that I regard life lightly? If you do, you are mis-
taken. I have seen too much of death. I do not regard life lightly. But I
say when four or five men sit in a room and examine banks and then
come back again and then decide which one they are going to attack and
they take a sawed off shotgun and five pistols and they go in there and
say, 'I will send to the death any man that stands in my way,' they forfeit
the right to live that has been paid for by the decent sons of honest moth-
ers of this state.281
It is clear that this argument in aggravation was designed to con-
trast the conduct of the defendants to the men who served their coun-
try in World War I. The implication was clear in this argument-not
only had the defendants not served their country in war, but they had
also been ineligible to do so because of their criminal activities, or
because they were otherwise unfit for military duty. No objection was
raised at trial or on appeal to this argument by Mr. Brooks.
278 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 536 (1978) (requiring individualized consideration of
mitigating factors); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that courts below
erred in refusing to consider evidence in the defendant's background as a mitigating factor).
279 Abstract, supra note 64, at 492.
280 Jury Verdict Form (on file with author).
281 Brooks referred to his own World War I experience: "I have marched with them [men,
who unlike the defendants, served their country] bowed down with muddy pack and muddy
rifle slung on their backs. And I have crawled with them from shell hole to shell hole. I have
been with them when the hours of night time have seemed like years and the days seemed
like decades ... I have seen them offered, seventeen or eighteen years old, on the altar, and
somehow I just can't help but feel that they are kneeling at the feet of Columbia,
155,000,000 human souls, the greatest group of organized society in the world, with her




Only Brown's record was before the jury when it returned ver-
dicts sentencing Brown, Shadlow, and Fisher to death. This was be-
cause Brown took the stand and was impeached with his felony
convictions. Although Jenkins took the stand, he had no felony con-
victions.
Brooks argued that the defendants were dangerous, based upon
their conduct during the robbery:
What do you think of the life of the warden of any penitentiary at the
hands of Brown and Shadlow 282 if they should hope to escape at all?
Those men that will move on that fortress of the bank with its alarms,
with its arms, with its policemen, in daylight on the busiest crossroad in
the world, where the plate-glass windows are open to the view of all,
what do you think of the nerve of men like that? Are you going to ask
another man to risk his life at their hands? Or are you going to raise your
arm and say, 'this is the reckoning day for men that defy every institution
of the state that allows us the opportunity to raise our young in an honest
, 283way.
Finally, Brooks asked the jury to be no less brave than French,
and informed the jury that it was their duty to protect the public by
ensuring the deaths of the defendants:
French, that colored man, that colored man, the best of his race, I salute
you, because I believe that there is no distinction in this country between
black and white. If these were white men, I would say the same thing. I
can say to you gentlemen, it is a sad day when we can't have twelve men
of that great mass of humanity that will stand up and say that guns must
stop barking at the doors of our homes; that guns must stop barking at
the vaults of the banks, to which the church, and the lodge and the home,
and the market, and the little humble boy who sells his papers or mows
lawns and takes his pennies there for safekeeping, I tell you honestly I
share this responsibility with you, and I am not asking you to do one
thing to relieve me of the responsibility. It is mine in the name of the
state. I have marched for this state to my death, and I am here today to
fight for her in a legal way.
284
Jenkins was the only defendant for whom there is some docu-
mentation concerning his background. This is because Jenkins sur-
vived in prison to make repeated applications for clemency. Jenkins'
1946 petition for release on parole stated that he worked in Kansas
282 Brooks did not include Jenkins in the category of dangerous defendants, thereby per-
haps suggesting that Jenkins did not deserve to die, confirming the allegation that there was a
deal made between the prosecutors and Jenkins in return for Jenkins' testimony at his trial,
and in return for testifying against Hare.
283 Id. at 469.
214 Id. at 482.
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City, Missouri for a meat packing firm from 1916-1918, and that
from 1918 to 1920 he worked for himself selling coal and wood.
From 1920-26 he worked as a taxi cab driver in Kansas City. There-
after, he moved to Detroit, got married, and became an auto me-
chanic. 85 In his 1946 clemency petition, Jenkins alleged that he was
"enticed into entering the scheme for the robbery of the bank, due to
his dire financial matters at home. He was na'ive enough to heed the
pleas of the others involved, after being assured that no violence
would occur."2"6 He intended to serve only as a lookout and did not
share in the proceeds of the robbery "as his conscience would not al-
low him to touch any of the ill-gotten gains." '287
Testimony that we would now refer to as "mitigation evidence"
was presented on behalf of the condemned defendant after they were
sentenced. This evidence was presented to the parole and pardon
board and to the Governor in an effort to convince the State not to
execute the defendants. Several stays of execution were granted after
it was alleged that the defendants were not mentally fit to be exe-
cuted.
The statute governing fitness to be sentenced provided:
A person that becomes lunatic or insane after the commission of a crime
or misdemeanor shall not be tried for the offense during the continuance
of the lunacy or insanity. If, after verdict of guilty and before judgment
pronounced, such person becomes lunatic or insane, then no judgment
shall be given while such lunacy or insanity shall continue. And if, after
judgment and before execution of the sentence, such person becomes lu-
natic or insane, then in case the punishment be capitol, the execution
thereof shall be stayed until the recovery of said person from the insanity
or lunacy. In all of these cases, it shall be the duty of the Court to im-
panel a jury to try the question whether the accused be, at the time of im-
paneling, insane or lunatic.
288
These petitions were filed after the Supreme Court of Illinois af-
firmed the Fisher, Shadlow, Brown convictions on direct appeal. On
July 31, 1930, Lofton wrote the Department of Public Welfare seek-
ing the appointment of a doctor to examine Fisher. He said:
285 Melvin Jenkins' Application for Executive Clemency (Dec. 3, 1946) (on file with au-
thor).
286 Id. at 3.
287 id.




Fisher is completely paralyzed from the nipple line down and has been in
this condition for the past several months. Judge Trude indicated that he
would appoint two alienists of the defense to be paid for by the state, but
then found that he was without power to do so.
28 9
Fisher's lawyer also filed a document in the Circuit Court of
Cook County stating:
Lafon Fisher, has since the entry of the judgment aforsaid against him,
has become and is now lunatic or insane, and has not sufficient intelli-
gence to realize or understand that he is under sentence of death, and
must suffer the same unless he shall show some sufficient cause why the
punishment ought to be postponed or not executed.
Both of his legs are completely paralyzed; that on a number of oc-
casions his legs would jump like one in a spasm and he was unable to
control them; that your petitioner is informed and believes that Lafon
Fisher's spinal chord has been crushed, and that he is suffering from an
organic disease of the central nervous system.
Lafon Fisher, has stopped your petitioner from talking to him, say-
ing that persons were listening, when it was apparent to your petitioner
that there was no one near his cell except your petitioner, and that he
stated to your petitioner that "they" were keeping him helpless to prevent
him getting out.
290
The Chicago Defender said of the attempts to block the execu-
tions:
For the eighth time the three members of the Franklin bank robbery gang
under death sentence for the murder of Martin French, killed during a
robbery of the bank on January 18, 1929 have eluded the beckoning arms
of the electric chair ... Attorney Richard E. Westbrooks, counsel for
Leon Brown, the third member of the gang, is still leading the fight to
save the men from death by electrocution and to have them committed to
an asylum for the criminal insane.
Attorney Joseph B. Lofton, who has appeared for Fisher throughout
the case has fought one of the most brilliant court battles of his career.
He and attorney Westbrooks, who has employed every means known to
law to save his client, have fought side by side.
289 Letter from Joseph Lofton to the Department of Public Welfare (July 31, 1930) (on
file with author).
290 Petition of James Fisher to Honorable Judges of Criminal Ct. of Cook County 1-2 (on
file with author).
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Attorney Westbrooks, whose career dates back to 1910 and who is a
veteran of many bitter court battles, declared that the fight to save Brown
from the chair is his greatest effort. It involves the right of a human being
and, like Mr. Lofton and Attorney L. Picquette, who recently entered the
case in the interest of Shadlow, declared that he will fight on until the
end.
Attorney John L. Fogle, who represented Shadlow during previous
trials, retired from the case after filing the insanity petition a month ago.
Attorney Lofton, Mr. Westbrooks, and Mr. Picquette, who are now
serving without pay, announced that they will spend their own money, if
necessary to see that their clients are properly protected and given every-
thing that the law allows.
291
Fisher, Brown, and Shadlow were executed, Shadlow first, and
then Fisher. Brown, who claimed that he was innocent, mounted a
campaign, led by Rev. Roseburough of the Moody Bible Institute, to
save his life. The campaign was based on Brown's claim of actual
innocence. Rev. Roseburough and his followers claimed that Brown
was innocent. They provided statements from Leonard Shadlow and
from Stephen Dixon, which stated that Brown had nothing to do with
the robbery.292 To counter this campaign, the trial court judge and a
banker's association filed letters with the Board of Pardon and Pa-
roles objecting to a commutation of sentence.2 3 Despite the interven-
tion of leading citizens on behalf of Brown, Brown was executed.
29 4
IV. CONCLUSION
What do we learn from this examination of Cook County's
criminal justice system in 1929?
The criminal justice system of 1929 was beset with many of the
same problems we face in the modem day. Crime was perceived to
be on the rise. The police and the courts were under pressure to per-
form more efficiently. Community groups and bar associations
worked tirelessly to improve the systems as demonstrated by the pub-
lication of the Survey. Although there was not the level of discomfort
with the death penalty in 1929 as there is today, the doubts raised by
29' Franklin Bank Killers Get Another Stay, Cm. DEFENDER, Aug. 23, 1930, at 2.
292 Letter from Rev. Chester Roseburough to the Board of Pardon & Parole (July 8, 1930)
(on file with author).
293 See Letter from Judge Robert E. Gentzel to the Illinois Board of Pardons and Paroles
(Sept. 19, 1930) (on file with author).
294 Certification of Execution by Sheriff John E. Traeger of Cook County (Nov. 28, 1930)
(on file with author).
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Brown's guilt remind us of more recent campaigns on behalf of de-
fendants who have asserted their innocence. The work done by those
who wrote the Survey was a part of a long tradition of citizen partici-
pation in justice system reform. The most recent of this tradition is
The Report of the Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Pun-
ishment, which identified substantial areas for improvement in the
administration of justice throughout the State of Illinois.295
An examination of the Fisher trial also gives us a sense of how
the procedural rules that govern the modem-day criminal trial have
developed and why many of these rules are necessary to protect the
integrity of criminal adjudications. The issue of what rules should
govern police interrogations of suspects, the impact of pre-trial pub-
licity, the need for pre-trial discovery, the need for pre-trial hearings
on the admissibility of confessions, and the need under certain cir-
cumstances for separate trials were raised without success by the
defendants' lawyers. The defense lawyers who participated in the
Fisher trial had a vision of how to make the trial of a criminal case
more fair.
The defendants' lawyers objected to the introduction of their cli-
ents' coerced confessions and sought, unsuccessfully, pre-trial hear-
ings on their admissibility. At trial, when a hearing regarding alleged
coercion was held outside of the presence of the jury, the lawyers
challenged the State's assertion that the defendants were not abused
by police. The assertions that the defendants made in this case about
the way in which they were treated by the police have been made re-
peatedly in other cases since 1929. As noted above, only now are
courts beginning to take a closer look at how to resolve the contest of
credibility between defendants who claim that they have been abused
and police and prosecutors who deny that defendants were coerced.
The lawyers objected to the fact that they were not given ade-
quate discovery. Their most well-taken objection was that they were
not provided with the statements of their clients until after the State
offered their clients' confessions into evidence. This assertion was
made with great clarity and skill at both the trial and appellate levels.
No reasons were given by the trial court or the Illinois Supreme Court
as to why at least this measure of discovery should not have been
granted, other than that providing defendants access to their confes-
sions before they are introduced into evidence was unheard of.
295 STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(2002).
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The need for separate trials was also a key issue. Although only
one defendant made a motion for severance before trial, Fisher, Shad-
low, and Brown all moved for a mistrial after Jenkins, in his testi-
mony and in his lawyer's closing argument, clearly pointed his finger
at his co-defendants. The then existing rule that the co-defendants'
lawyers could not cross-examine a testifying co-defendant made the
need for a severance all the more acute. Interestingly, however, the
defense lawyers made no motion to sever the cases on appeal, nor did
they file separate briefs on behalf of their individual clients.
No thought was given to presenting mitigation evidence on be-
half of the defendants. No statute required a hearing in aggravation
and mitigation. The jury was obligated to consider whether to sen-
tence the defendants to prison or death with no guidance. In making
this decision, the jury had no information about the backgrounds of
any of the defendants, except for the criminal record of Brown who
was impeached with his prior convictions. Only after the trial, when
the defense lawyers tried to save their clients' lives by claiming that
they were unfit to be executed, did information about the defendants'
backgrounds come to light.
The Fisher case also teaches us about the power of lawyering.
Two able lawyers, Charles Bellows and Wayland Brooks, prosecuted
the case. While one could quarrel with some of the tactics used by the
prosecution, especially the extent to which it relied upon arguably
coerced confessions and upon pre-trial publicity to obtain a jury
likely to convict, one cannot read the record without being impressed
by the technical skills displayed by the prosecutors in planning and
carrying out the prosecution.296 Brooks' closing argument was a dis-
play of rhetorical skill that we do not often see in courtrooms today.
296 Another interesting fact is that his trial was one of the first in which ballistics evidence
was introduced. Abstract, supra note 64 at 337-342. The testimony of Calvin Goddard tied
the bullets found in the body of Marvin French to the weapons recovered by the police. Id. at
337-381. A Smith & Wesson pistol, the gun that fired one of the fatal shots, was found in an
ash heap in the basement of the house in which the defendants were arrested. Id. at 478. The
shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime were tied to the shotgun found in the car that
was allegedly driven by the robbers. Id. at 352. The defense lawyers seemed completely un-
prepared for this testimony and unsuccessfully challenged it on appeal, claiming that the tes-
timony was "novel" and should not have been admitted. (Th'e'Supreme Court of Illinois
rejected the defendants' contention: "We are of the opinion that in this case, where the wit-
ness has been able to testify that by the use of magnifying instruments and by reason of his
experience and study he has been able to determine the condition of a certain exhibit, which
condition he details to the jury, such evidence, while the jury are not bound to accept his
conclusions as true, is competent expert testimony on a subject properly one for expert
knowledge." Fisher, 172 N.E. at 754.)
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The zeal and dedication of the defense lawyers was also appar-
ent. The efforts of the defense were particularly noteworthy on ap-
peal and during the sanity and clemency process. Richard
Westbrooks, in particular, pursued every available option to save
Leon Brown's life. Perhaps this was because he believed that Brown
was innocent. After Dixon was arrested and sentenced to prison, he
asserted that Brown had nothing to do with the robbery. Brown was
the only defendant to testify.
Finally, the lack of even-handedness in the application of the
death penalty must be noted. Dixon, the man who the State eventu-
ally conceded fired the shotgun blast that killed French, the Franklin
Trust security guard, received a life sentence in return for his guilty
plea, while Shadlow, who the State seemingly incorrectly claimed at
trial fired the shotgun, was executed. Brown and Fisher, whose roles
in the actual shooting of French were never made clear, were exe-
cuted. Herbert Hare, the man who allegedly planned and financed the
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